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Gifts have been given special treatment by the income tax laws since
the first post-16th Amendment tax statute was adopted in 1913.2 The
determination of how the income tax law should treat gifts raises a
number of issues. For example: should gifts be given special treatment?
If so, what should qualify as a gift? Should gifts to a private party be
taxable to the donee? Should gifts to a private party be deductible by the
donor? Should the donee's basis in a gift of property be determined by
reference to the basis that the donor had, and should any modifications
of the donee's basis be made because of transfer taxes or other costs
incurred pursuant to executing the transfer? If gifts to charitable
organizations are deductible, 3 should the definition of what constitutes a
2 The Revenue Act of 1913 excluded gifts from the donee's income. Act of
October 3, 1913, ch.16, § 11 (B), 38 Stat. 167 (1913) (current version at 26 U.S.C.).
That exclusion has been retained in the tax law and is currently located at § 102 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. The 1894 federal income tax law, which was
struck down because large parts of it were held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court's decision in Pollack v. FarmersLoan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), taxed gifts
of personal property as income, but did not tax gifts of realty. Act of Aug 27, 1894,
ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553. See 26 CONG. REc. 6820-25 (1894).
3 In this Article, we will not discuss the question of whether a deduction should
be allowed for charitable gifts. For a discussion of that issue, see Jeffrey H. Kahn,
Personal Deductions-A Tax "Ideal" or Just Another "Deal"?, 2002 L. REV. MICH. STATE
UNIv.-DETROIT COLL. LAW 1.
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gift be the same as the one employed in determining whether transfers
between private parties are gifts?
One topic that this Article addresses is the question of the propriety
of excluding gifts from a donee's income, an exclusion that has been part
4
of the income tax law since the modern income tax was adopted in 1913.
A number of commentators have decried that exclusion and, contending
that there is no principled justification for it, have urged that donees be
required to include gifts in their income. 5 We take issue with that view
and contend that there is a principled tax policy justification for
excluding gifts from a donee's income. The justification lies in the goals
and structure of the income tax system itself. In addition, in this Article,
we will address the other questions raised above. We will not discuss a
number of related items, such as the exclusion from income of devises
and inheritances and the exclusion of life insurance proceeds, but will
deal only with gifts, and only as to the income taxation of gifts. While
much of what is written about the income tax treatment of gifts applies
equally to devises and inheritances, there are additional issues that apply
exclusively to the latter, especially as to the basis that a devisee or
beneficiary acquires in inherited property. We have omitted discussion of
devises and inheritances in order to sharpen our focus on the topic at
hand.
We will discuss the effect of gift taxes on the income taxation of gifts,
but we will not examine the merits of imposing a gift tax or other transfer
tax. Transfer taxation is a major topic which, in many respects, operates
independently of the income tax. The reasons for imposing gift taxes are
entirely different from the purposes of the income tax. 6 Although the
two types of taxes can operate simultaneously on the same transaction, it
4

See supra note 2.

5

See, e.g.,

HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION

56-58, 125 (1938);

Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in
Income, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1177 (1978); William Klein, An Enigma in the FederalIncome
Tax: The Meaning of the Word "Gift", 48 MINN. L. REV. 215 (1963); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, The ConstitutionalMeaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25
CONN. L. REv. 1, 28-37 (1992); Lawrence Zelenak, Commentary, The Reasons for a
Consumption Tax and the Tax Treatment of Gifts and Bequests, 51 TAX L. REv. 601, 602-03
(1996). For example, Professor Klein stated in his 1963 article that "there simply is no
good tax policy reason for excluding gifts, or inheritances, from the income tax base
and that consequently the term 'income' must, for tax purposes, be construed to
include gifts." Klein, supra, at 224. Standing out in opposition to that view, Professor

Alvin Warren concluded that gifts should be taxable either to the donor or to the
donee, but not to both. Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an
Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1088 (1980).
6 See ALAN GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 190 (5th ed.
2002).
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is useful to isolate the discussion of each tax system and to refer to the
other only to the extent of their interaction. To discuss the gift tax in any
depth, we would have to examine the estate tax and the extent to which
the former tax complements the latter. If we so expanded the scope of
this Article, it would detract from our goal of providing a concentrated
focus on what itself is a broad subject.
The question of whether there is a principled justification for the
income tax's exclusion of gifts is of considerable importance. If there
were no justification, not only would there be a strong case for a
legislative repeal of the gift exclusion, but the judicial and administrative
construction of the statutory exclusion would likely restrict its scope as far
as it is feasible to do. The seriousness of the risk that a court might be led
to read the exclusionary statute narrowly is evidenced by the urging of
Professor William Klein that they do so. Asserting that there is no
legitimate tax policy objective for the gift exclusion, in a 1963 article,
Professor Klein listed several approaches that the courts might take in
construing the statute. The approach that he preferred was that the "gift
exclusion . . . be given as narrow an application as the language of the
7
statute permits."
Contrary to the more popular view among academics, we contend
that not only is the gift exclusion consistent with income tax policy, it
furthers and implements an important aspect of that policy-namely,
that the payment of an income tax purchases the right to have the taxed
income used by the taxpayer, or by someone else of the taxpayer's
choosing, to acquire and consume societal goods or services. That
contention supports the current exclusion of gifts from income. Also, as
illustrated later in this Article, the identification of the function that the
gift exclusion plays in furthering tax policy can be an aid to courts in
construing the application of that provision, and sheds light on the issue
of the standard that should be applied to determine whether a transfer to
a charity should be deductible. It is not our position that it would be
wrong to tax a donee; rather, it is our contention that the exclusion of
gifts from income furthers one important tax policy and contravenes
another, and the decision to exclude gifts is based on the making of a
choice between those two conflicting tax principles.
The Article also addresses the question of the proper standard to be
applied in determining whether a transfer to a private party qualifies for
the gift exclusion. We conclude that the standard currently employed,
while appropriate in most circumstances, should be modified to
accommodate special circumstances. We also examine the current rules
for determining a donee's basis in donated property and question
7

Klein, supra note 5, at 260,
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whether the adjustments currently allowed to a donee's basis are
appropriate. The Article discusses "net gifts" (i.e., gifts which generate a
gift tax that the donee is required to pay by the terms of the gift) and
questions the correctness of the controlling Supreme Court decision on
the income tax treatment of such gifts. 8 Finally, we examine the
unsettled status of the rules for determining whether, and to what extent,
a transfer to a charity qualifies as a charitable gift. The resolution of the
first issue discussed in this Article (the identification of a policy
justification for excluding gifts) bears significantly on the resolution of
the other issues listed above-i.e., the issues are interrelated.
I.

THE EXCLUSION OF GIFTS FROM THE DONEE'S INCOME

Section 102(a) of the 1986 Internal Revenue Code 9 excludes
gifts, bequests and inheritances from the donee's income. The income from a gift is included in the donee's income as is the gift of a
right to income when the income is received.' 0
A.

The Currently Applied Definition of "Gift" for Purposes of
the Exclusion

Before examining the rationales of those who oppose the exclusion for gifts and our reasons for holding the contrary view, let us
examine how the term "gift" has been defined by the Supreme Court.
Later, we will consider how it ought to be defined.
The legislature has not provided a definition of the term "gift,"
although it does list in Code § 102 several transactions that do not
qualify for the exclusion from income.1 The Supreme Court defined
2
the term in the 1960 landmark case, Commissioner v. Duberstein.1
While several other Supreme Court decisions1 3 of the same vintage
8

See infra Part III.C.

9 Hereinafter referred to as "Code" or "I.R.C."
10 I.R.C. § 102(b) (2000); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.102-1(b), (c) (1956). Under
certain circumstances, income from the donated property that is subsequently received will be taxed to the donor under the "Anticipatory Assignment of Income"
doctrine. See DouGLAs A. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 694-700 (4th ed. 1999). The

anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is a special concept designed to prevent
the manipulation of tax bracket rates and has no relevance to the issues discussed in
this Article.
11 I.R.C. §§ 102(b), (c).
12 363 U.S. 278 (1960); see also Bogardus v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 34 (1937) (defining
the term gift as used in common language).
13 See Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) (consolidated with Duberstein); see also United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960) (holding that a union's
payments to a striking worker were a gift). Because the Supreme Court's Duberstein
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provide some insight into the judicial application of the gift exclusion,
it is the Duberstein decision that is uniformly cited as establishing the
meaning of the term.
The facts of the Duberstein case were that, over a period of years,
Duberstein had obliged a business associate by giving the latter the
names of potential clients.' 4 Duberstein neither sought nor expected
any recompense for that assistance.1 5 The business associate, in appreciation of the assistance he had received, gave Duberstein a Cadillac automobile.1 6 The Government contended that the value of the
automobile was income to Duberstein, and the latter contended that
it was excluded from income as a gift.' 7 The tax court held for the
Government,' and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.1 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated Duberstein with another case (Stanton v. United States) .20 The Court faced
the question of how the term "gift" should be defined for the purpose
of the exclusion.
In Duberstein, the Government contended that the test for
whether a transfer is a gift should be whether the transfer was made
for personal as distinguished from business reasons, and the Government urged the adoption of a number of objective factors to apply
that test.y'

The Court rejected the Government's position on the

question of the standard to be applied. 22 The Court held that the
determination of whether a transfer was a gift is a factual issue, 23 and
so the Court held that the tax court's determination must be sustained since it was not clearly erroneous. 24 The Court laid down the
standard to be applied in determining whether a transfer is a gift.
The Court noted that a voluntary transfer of property without consideration is not necessarily a gift for income tax purposes. The mere
absence of a legal or moral obligation to make the transfer is not conclusive. 25 Something more is required. The Court stated that "the
opinion deals with the consolidated cases of Stanton and Duberstein, the holding in
Stanton is incorporated in that opinion. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 278.
14 Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 280.
15 Id.
16 hd.
17 Id. at 281.
18 Duberstein v. Comm'r, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 16 (1958).
19 Duberstein v. Comm'r, 265 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
20 361 U.S. 923 (1959).
21 Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 284.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 286.
24 Id. at 291.
25 Id. at 293.
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most critical consideration" is the intention of the transferor and
quoted with approval the statement, "What controls is the intention
with which payment, however voluntary, has been made. '2 6

The

Court defined a gift as a transfer that "proceeds from a 'detached and
disinterested generosity.'" 2 7 That language of the Supreme Court
("detached and disinterested generosity") typically is quoted by courts
in passing on the question of whether a transfer is a gift;2 1 the ques-

tion of whether a transaction was so motivated is a question of fact to
be resolved by the trier of facts. 29 The Court also said that a gift is a
transfer that is made "out of affection, respect, admiration, charity, or
like impulses," 30 but it is the "detached and disinterested generosity"
3
language that has controlled the decisions in this area. '
1. Transfers to Employees and Their Spouses
The application of the Supreme Court's standard has not been
without problems. One question that arose both before and after Duberstein, and as to which conflicting results were reached by the courts,
is whether a voluntary transfer to an employee or to the spouse of a
deceased employee could be a gift in certain circumstances. 32 Congress resolved that issue in 1986 by adding subsection (c) to Code
§ 102. Section 102(c) precludes the application of § 102(a)'s exclusion from income for transfers made "to, or for the benefit of, an employee." 33 Unless another exclusion provision applies, an employer's

transfer of property to an employee will be included in the employee's
26 Id. at 285, 286 (quoting Bogardus v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 34, 45 n.8 (1937) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
27 Id. at 285. The language "detached and disinterested generosity" was quoted
by the Duberstein Court from an earlier opinion of the Court in Commissionerv. LoBue,
351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956).
28 E.g., Olk v. United States, 536 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1976).
29 See Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 286; see also United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 304
(1960).
30 Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285 (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711,
714 (1952)).
31 E.g., Kaiser, 363 U.S. at 304; LoBue, 351 U.S. at 246; 01k, 536 F.2d at 879.
32 The principal issue after Duberstein concerned the treatment of payments to
the surviving spouse of a deceased employee. After the Duberstein decision, the Tax
Court changed its view and held with fair consistency that payments to a surviving
spouse were income; but district courts fairly consistently held that such payments
were excluded from income as gifts unless the employer was a corporation dominated

by the family or there were other circumstances indicating that the payment was compensation. BORIS I. BIYIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES

33

AND GiFTs
10.2.4 (2d ed. 1989).
I.R.C. § 102(c) (2000).

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 78:2

income. 34 In our opinion, it is virtually certain that § 102(c) prevents
gift exclusion treatment for a transfer made to the surviving spouse of
a deceased employee even though not required of the employer by a
preexisting agreement with the deceased employee. Although the
employee is deceased, the payment to the spouse is made to a natural
object of the employee's bounty in recognition of the employee's services, and therefore fits within the statutory language addressing transfers made "for the benefit of an employee." Moreover, while there is
no discussion of the 1986 addition of § 102(c) in the Committee Reports to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, of which the amendment was a
part, as noted above, the question of whether the § 102(a) exclusion
applied to payments to surviving spouses was a significant issue at that
time. 35 It is beyond belief that Congress would have intended
§ 102(c) to apply only to payments made to or on behalf of a living
employee, and therefore would have intended to leave unsettled the
question of how payments to a surviving spouse are to be treated.
However, there is no authority as to whether § 102(c) applies in that
situation, and at least one major treatise reached the opposite conclusion to ours .3

Notwithstanding the unrestricted language of the 1986 amendment, the Service states in Proposed Regulation § 1.102-1(f)(2) that
an extraordinary transfer to a natural object of the transferor's
bounty, who also happens to be an employee, can qualify for the gift
exclusion of Code § 102(a) if not made in recognition of employment. So, a gift from a mother to her son will not be denied an exclusion merely because the son is an employee of his mother.
2.

Tips

Although, in our view, the 1986 statutory amendment solved the
employee issue, there are other issues that are not expressly resolved
by the statutory language. Customers may pay tips to persons who
provide them services but who are not their employees. Tips are a
reward for good service, and the prospect of receiving them is an incentive to provide good service. The transfer is not a product of detached and disinterested generosity any more than is a voluntary
payment to an employee. Tips and gratuities for services rendered are
34 Id.Some benefits to employees may be excluded under other provisions of the
Code, but they cannot qualify for the gift exclusion provided by § 102(a). See, e.g.,
id.
§§ 74(c), 132(a). The 1986 amendment also precludes the application of the
§ 102(a) exclusion to bequests made to employees.
35

BITTKER & LOKKEN,

36

Id.

supra note 32,

10.2.4.
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included in the recipient's income.3 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
stated that " [w] here the payment is in return for services rendered, it
is irrelevant that the donor derives no economic benefit from it."38
If adequate tips were not paid to an employee, the employer
would be required to increase the employee's wages or risk losing the
employee's services. In effect, the customer votes on the amount of
compensation the employee will receive according to the quality of
the employee's work, of which the customer is the bestjudge. The tip
effectively is made to the employee on behalf of the employer, and so
constitutes constructive income to the employer, but the employer's
constructive income is washed out by the deduction allowed for the
employer's constructive payment to the employee. Tips truly are additional compensation to an employee.
3.

Transfers to Non-Employees Whose Work Benefited the
Transferor

Another problem exists where a voluntary transfer is made to
someone who does not perform services for the transferor, but who
does perform services from which the transferor derives enjoyment or
other benefit. For example, if a football team holds a special day to
honor a star player, and fans make "gifts" to the player on that day,
should the "gifts" be excluded under Code § 102? While the star
player does not provide services directly to a fan in the way that a
waiter provides services to a customer, the fan does derive a benefit
from the player's performance. However, the commercial connection
between the fan and the player is too remote to require income treatment, and the "gift" is likely to be motivated by "detached and disinterested generosity"-i.e., to provide an expression of the fan's
appreciation and affection for the player. 39 Although there is a commercial relationship between a fan and a player, it is not one for
which there is an expectation that the fan will contribute to the
player's compensation.
On the other hand, if a transferee's employer solicits donations
to be made to the employee from others who enjoy the employee's
services and makes it clear that such donations are essential if the em37

Cracchiola v. Comm'r, 643 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-

2(a)(1) (1995);
38 Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952). This language was
quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in its Duberstein decision, and in footnote

seven of that decision, the Court expressly noted that tips are included in income.
Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 n.7 (1960).
39

See Kralstein v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 810 (1962), acq., 1963-2 C.B. 4; Rev. Proc. 68-

19, 1968-1 C.B. 810.
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ployee is to be retained, then the donations may properly be characterized as compensatory to retain the benefits of the transferee's
services. Goodwin v. United States40 provides a good example. A pastor
of a small church was paid a low salary. Members of the congregation
made routinized and periodic cash "gifts" to the pastor, who likely
would have left that pulpit if he had not received those "gifts" to supplement his salary. Regardless of whether the members of the congregation who made those gifts could be deemed to be the pastor's
employer, the court applied Duberstein principles to hold that the socalled "gifts" were income to the pastor. An alternative approach that
might have been taken (but was not) is to focus on the role of the
transferee rather than on the intention of the transferor. We will explore later in this Article (in connection with our discussion of 01k v.
United States4 1) whether such an approach is permissible under cur-

rent law, and whether it is desirable to apply it in certain
42
circumstances.
Similarly, if the reason for making a transfer is that the transferor
seeks to protect or expand a business relationship with the transferee's employer, the transfer does not qualify as a gift. 43 Also, a transfer that is made for the purpose of advertising a product should not
qualify as a gift. For example, if an automobile dealer were to make a
public display of "giving" a car to a star athlete in full view of a sizeable
number of fans, the transfer should not be treated as a gift.
An especially interesting case that raises the question of the
meaning of the Duberstein standard is the Ninth Circuit's 1976 decision in 01k v. United States.44 We will defer discussion of that case until
after examining the tax policy justification for the gift exclusion. First,
however, we will set forth the current rules for determining a donee's
basis in donated property. After examining the tax policy justification
for the gift exclusion, we will return to an examination of the donee
basis rules to question whether they should be modified.
B. Donee's Basis in Donated Property Under Current Tax Law
When a donee acquires property by gift, the donee takes the
same basis in that property that the donor had immediately before the
40

67 F.3d 149 (8th Cir. 1995). Tips also can be put into this category of income.

See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a) (1).
41 536 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1976); see infra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
42 See infra Part II.
43 See Kralstein, 38 T.C. at 810. But cf Pellar v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 299 (1955) (holding that a discount given to the daughter of a business associate in order to retain the
latter's business did not constitute income to the daughter).
44 01k, 536 F.2d at 876.
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transfer took place. 45 The donated property is referred to as "transferred basis property" or as "substituted basis property. '46 This transferred basis rule was adopted in 1921 and has been retained in the tax
law since then. 47 There is a limitation on the amount of basis that a
donee can obtain from the donor. For purposes of determining the
amount of loss that a donee subsequently realizes on a disposition of
the property, and only for the purposes of determining a loss, the
donee's basis at the time of receipt of the property cannot exceed the
fair market value of the property at that time. 48 Thus, when a donee
receives property whose value is less than the donor's basis, the donee
will have two bases for the property: one basis equal to the donor's
basis for purposes of measuring the amount of gain the donee will
realize on a subsequent disposition of the property, and a different
basis equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of the
gift for purposes of determining the amount of loss the donee will
realize on a subsequent disposition of the property.
A gift to a donee may incur the imposition of a gift tax to the
extent that the gift is not protected by the annual exclusion, a deduction, or the unified credit. 49 In the Technical Amendments Act of
1958, Congress amended § 1015 by adding subsection (d) which provides that a donee's transferred basis in donated property is to be increased (but not above the fair market value of the property at the
time of the gift) by the amount of gift tax paid with respect to that
gift.50 In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress further limited the
amount of gift tax that can be added to the donee's transferred ba5
sis. 1 Under current rules, only the amount of gift tax on the transfer
that is attributable to the appreciated portion of the donated property
(i.e., the amount by which the fair market value of the donated property exceeds the donor's basis immediately before the gift) can be added to the donee's transferred basis.5 2 As was true previously, the
addition to the donee's transferred basis cannot raise the donee's basis to a figure that is greater than the fair market value of the donated
45
46
47

I.R.C. § 1015(a) (2000).
Id. §§ 7701 (a) (42)-(43).
See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET

AL,, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

120 n.16 (12th ed.

2000).
48 I.R.C. § 1015(a).
49
50

Id. §§ 2501 (a) (1), 2503(b), 2505, 2522, 2523.
Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1640 (codi-

fied as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C).
51

Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1784, 1834, 1877 (codi-

fied as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
52

I.R.C. § 1015(d) (6).
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property at the time of the gift. The method for determining the
amount of gift tax that is attributable to the appreciated portion of the
donated property is described in Treasury Regulation § 1.1015-5(c).5-1
C.

The Tax Policy Justificationfor Excluding Gifts from Income

1. The Reasons Offered for Including Gifts in Income
The earliest and most prominent commentator to dispute the gift
exclusion and urge that gifts be included in income was Henry C.
Simons. In his seminal book, PersonalIncome Taxation,5 4 Simons formulated a concept or definition of personal income that impliedly
included gratuitous transfers.5 5 Simons rested his rejection of a gift
exclusion on his concept of personal income and on the tax policies
that are reflected in that concept. Simons's concept of personal income is commonly referred to as the "Haig-Simons definition." Subsequent proponents of taxing gifts to the donee similarly rested their
position on their construction of the Haig-Simons concept of personal
income and the tax policies reflected therein. 56 Let us then examine
that concept and the tax policies that it reflects.
0
Simons defined personal income as
[t]he algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and (2) the change in value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and the end of the period in question.

InI other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the period to "wealth" at the end of the period and then
subtracting "wealth" at the beginning.

57

This formulation (the so-called "Haig-Simons definition") is
aimed at measuring an individual's ability to bear a portion of the cost
of government on the premise that the cost should be borne by members of the public in proportion to their means to do so. As Professor
William Andrews observed, the Haig-Simons formulation might best
be described as an equation rather than as a definition-i.e., it is akin
to the familiar equation that assets equals liabilities plus net worth. 58
Andrews suggests that instead of saying that income means consumption plus accumulation, it is more accurate to say that "an ideal per53 Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-5(c) (as amended in 1995).
54 SIMONS, supra note 5.
55 Id. at 56-57, 125.
56 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 5, at 1183 n.30; Klein, supra note 5, at 226-27.
57 SIMONS, supra note 5, at 50.
58 William D. Andrews, PersonalDeductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv.
309, 315 (1972).
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sonal income tax is one in which tax burdens are accurately
apportioned to aggregate personal consumption plus accumula59
tion."
The term "consumption" is not defined in that formulation. We
will discuss the meaning of that term later in this Article. 60 For now,
we will adopt the definition that Professor Warren used-namely that
"'consumption' means the ultimate use or destruction of economic
resources." 61 Warren defined "economic resources" as the goods and
services that are generally the subject of market transactions in our
society, expressly excluding psychic benefits.

62

We would add to War-

ren's definition the proviso that the "consumption" to which the HaigSimons definition refers is personal consumption-i.e., consumption
for the personal purposes of the consumer as contrasted to the use or
destruction of economic resources for business or profit-making purposes. Any reference in this Article to "consumption" is to be understood to refer to personal consumption.
The effect of including current personal consumption in the
equation is that the market value of the consumption itself is taxed. If
X earns income which X promptly uses to purchase and consume services, X has none of the income remaining at the end of the accounting period, and yet X is taxed on the full amount of the income.
There is no meaningful difference between taxing X's income and
taxing the consumption itself. What difference is there then between
a consumption tax and an income tax? The difference is that a consumption tax imposes a tax when the taxpayer actually consumes
some item or service. The tax on income that is accumulated and
invested is deferred until that income is used for consumption. In
contrast, while the income tax does tax current consumption, it also
taxes income that is accumulated during the accounting period. It is
the element of taxing accumulated income that distinguishes the two.
Although nominally aimed at measuring income, the HaigSimons formulation is integrally associated with personal consumption. Indeed, the "income" of an individual can be viewed as a surrogate for consumption-measuring the value of the individual's
current consumption plus the present value of the future consumption 63 that can be obtained by the use of the accumulated wealth. The
59 Id. at 316.
60 See infra Part I.C.3.
61 Warren, supra note 5, at 1084.
62 Id.
63 The actual cost of future consumption should be discounted to determine the
present market value of that consumption, but because the accumulated wealth that
will be used to purchase the future consumption can be invested and thereby grow to
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taxation of income effectively is a tax on current consumption plus a
tax on future consumption that will be enjoyed by the taxpayer or by

someone else. The income tax subsumes an assumption that accumulated income will be used for consumption at some future date, and
that it does not matter whether it is so used by the taxpayer or by
someone else.
What is the justification for taxing current consumption? The aggregate members of society produce a pool of goods and services. In
a simple economy, such as that employed in an agrarian society, the
Government could simply take a share of those goods when they are
produced and leave the division of what is left to the persons involved.
Modern society is too complex for that to be a feasible system of taxation. So, instead, a tax is imposed on individuals according to their
respective incomes. 64 Because the Government cannot conveniently
capture a portion of the goods produced by society at their source, it
captures their economic equivalent from the individuals who have acquired or ultimately will acquire the societal goods. The income that
an individual receives represents the sum of current consumption,
which in turn represents societal goods that the individual has acquired for his exclusive use, and future consumption, which represents the societal goods that will be purchased with the individual's
accumulated income at a future date.
When an individual uses an amount of income for consumption
purposes in the year in which the income was received, the individual
has removed the purchased goods or services from the common pool,
and they are no longer available to anyone else in society. Those
goods or services are captured by the individual to the exclusion of
everyone else. It is an appropriate scheme to tax individuals in accordance with the amount of societal goods they have taken to themselves to the exclusion of others, and the income tax system does that
in regard to current consumption. In effect, because the Government
cannot conveniently take its share of societal goods at their source,
the goods are traced to the individuals who capture them, and each
individual is taxed in proportion to the amount of societal goods that
individual captured for his preclusive use. The common pool conpurchase a greater amount of consumption in the future, the present value of the
future consumption can be seen to be approximately equal to the amount of wealth
accumulated in the current year. Of course, the growth of current wealth will come
in the form of income, whether ordinary income or capital gains, and that income
will be subjected to income taxation unless it comes from inherited appreciation or
tax-free investments; and so the taxation of income earned from savings does constitute a kind of double taxation.
64 See Warren, supra note 5, at 1085.
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cept, which we will discuss below, has its detractors. But, as to the
taxation of current consumption, the justification of preclusive use
seems unobjectionable.
In certain circumstances, the tax law does not tax a person for his
preclusive consumption, but the reason for such exclusions is that the
factual circumstances that are present raise competing tax principles
or economic issues that Congress deemed sufficient to warrant an exclusion from income. For example, an employee is not taxed on the
receipt of certain fringe benefits that are described in specific Code
provisions, such as Code §§ 119 and 132. Although the employee
does consume those benefits, and so the failure to tax them violates
the tax principles of horizontal and vertical equity, the competing
principles (in the view of Congress) outweigh those considerations, or
Congress concluded that there are societal and economic benefits of
greater importance than income equity to excluding those items from
the employee's income. The term "horizontal and vertical equity" refers to the principles that persons with the same amount of income
should pay the same amount of income tax, and that persons with
disparate amounts of income should pay different amounts of tax that
correlate to the difference in their incomes. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to examine whether those competing principles or economic objectives do outweigh horizontal and vertical equity principles. It is sufficient for current purposes to note that the tax
treatment of such items is sui generis and does not contradict our
statement of the fundamental principles on which income taxation is
grounded.
But, what is the justification for taxing accumulated income? If
one were to adopt the preclusive use basis for the income tax (incorporating the common pool concept), would that mean that accumulated income should not be taxed because no goods have been
consumed yet? We make no such contention. To the contrary, our
view, as explained above, is that the amount of income that is accumulated is properly taxed at that time because it represents the present
value of the consumption that presumably will take place at some future date. In other words, an income tax differs from a consumption
tax in that the income tax imposes a tax currently on the present value
of future consumption instead of waiting until the future consumption takes place and taxing it then. While a case might be made for
substituting a consumption tax for the income tax system currently in
use, we do not address in this Article the question of which tax is preferable. It is important, however, to recognize that an income tax system incorporates a tax on the present value of future consumption.
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Some of those commentators who urge that gifts be taxable have
a different view of the justification for taxing accumulated income.
Their view is that the earner's possession of the power to employ the
income how and when the income earner chooses to do so is a sufficient reason to tax that accumulation. 6 5 For example, Professor Korn-

hauser maintains that Simons based the income tax on the
individual's "power to control society's scarce resources," and that
Simons meant by consumption, not private consumption, but the
"power to affect consumption. '6 6 It is noteworthy that even in Kornhauser's view of the basis of taxation, consumption is closely associated with income in that the "power to affect consumption" is the
source of taxing income.
The dependence of income determination on a taxpayer's personal consumption is evidenced by the Code's provision of a tax deduction for expenditures that do not constitute a personal
consumption (referred to hereafter as "nonconsumption" expenditures).6 7 If, in Year One, Zreceived $10 for services performed, and if
Z did not spend that $10 in that year, Z will be taxed on the $10 of
income. If Z spent $10 in Year One to purchase a personal consumption, Z will receive no deduction for that expenditure, and so Z will
still bear the tax imposed on the $10 of income that Z received that
year. But, if in Year One, Z made a nonconsumption expenditure of
$10 (such as a payment for a business expense or for the production
of income or to conserve income-producing property), Z would be
allowed a tax deduction of $10, which effectively would negate the $10
of income she received. The effect of allowing the deduction is to
delete the $10 of income from the tax base. Similarly, if instead of
making the nonconsumption expenditure in Year One, Z made a $10
nonconsumption expenditure in Year Three, the $10 deduction allowed to Z in Year Three would effectively erase the tax burden that
she endured for the $10 of income that she reported in Year One.
If the criterion for taxing income is, as Professor Kornhauser
maintains, that the taxpayer obtained the "power to affect consumption," the taxpayer's actual use of the income for nonconsumption
purposes should not affect the taxation of that income. To the contrary, however, a tax on income will not prevail permanently unless
the taxpayer either uses the income for personal consumption purposes or has someone of his choosing so use it. If income measure65
66

E.g., Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 32.
Id.

67

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 62 (2000).
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ment is not merely a surrogate for personal consumption, the two
concepts are bonded together as tightly as are Siamese twins.
Some nonconsumption expenditures are treated as nonitemized
deductions which are subject to limitations on the amount that can be
deducted. 68 These limitations purportedly were adopted for administrative purposes-i.e., they are intended to relieve taxpayers of some
of the burdensome recordkeeping requirements and to reduce the
complexity of filling out income tax forms. A cynical observer might
conclude that the true purpose of the adoption of many of these limitations was to increase revenue collections, and that deduction limitations was the form that was adopted because that was politically more
palatable than would be an increase in tax rates. The adoption of
those limitations for the purpose of political or administrative expediency does not contravene the point made in the paragraph above.
Kornhauser notes that the view of preclusive use as the basis for
income taxation has its roots in the "common pool" concept that
Thomas Hobbes advanced many years ago, 69 a concept which she and
others have criticized as seriously flawed. But, even if the preclusive
use concept were rejected, that does not eliminate the close tie that
exists between the taxation of income and the consumption of that
income. Because current consumption is taxed when it takes place,
the tax on accumulated income should not be duplicated by taxing it
a second time when it is used for consumption at a future date. A
principle of income taxation must be that an individual, having paid
an income tax on accumulated income, has the privilege to use that
income for consumption without thereby incurring an additional income tax. We will discuss later the significance that this principle has
to the resolution of the question of how gifts should be treated by the
income tax law.
The Haig-Simons definition is regarded as an expression of an
ideal to which the tax system should aspire. 70 It is an expression of
good tax policy to which tax rules should conform unless a competing
consideration outweighs the virtues of maintaining that policy. Tax
reformers often use that definition as a standard against which tax
provisions should be measured. For example, the concept of a "Comprehensive Tax Base" (CTB) is based on applying the Haig-Simons
definition. 71 While there are reasons to question whether the income
68 E.g., id. § 68.
69 Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 30-31; see THOMAS
Oakeshott ed., 1960).
70

See Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 28.

71

See Dodge, supra note 5, at 1183 & n.30.
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tax law should adhere strictly to that definition, 72 we will accept the
definition in this Article, but maintain that, contrary to Simons's assertion, some of the tax policies that are reflected in that definition support the exclusion for gifts.
Let us first examine the reasoning of those who contend that gifts
should be included in income. The genesis of that contention lies
with Henry Simons himself. Simons contended that the accumulation
of wealth should be taxed regardless of how the wealth was obtained.
Simons stated, "The income tax is not a tax upon income but a tax
upon persons according to their respective incomes; and ...

the ob-

jective of policy must be fairness among persons, not fairness among
kinds of receipts. . .. -73 Simons also stated,
Our definition of income perhaps does violence to traditional usage
in specifying impliedly a calculation which would include gratuitous
receipts. To exclude gifts ....

would be to introduce additional

arbitrary distinctions; it would be necessary to distinguish among an
74
individual's receipts according to the intentions of second parties.
In other words, receipts increase an individual's capacity to consume,
and the income tax law should focus on that capacity and not on how
the individual obtained it. If taken in isolation, this is a powerful argument. While Simons based his view of how gifts should be treated
primarily on his conclusion that the underlying principles of an income tax system provide no basis for excluding gifts from income, he
also suggested that an exclusion of gifts requires an inquiry into the
subjective motives of transferors, 75 which Simons believed would impose an undue administrative burden on the taxing authorities. Experience with the administration of the gift exclusion has not borne out
that fear, especially after Congress resolved the treatment of gifts to
employees and their spouses in the 1986 amendment to Code § 102.
Subsequent proponents of including gifts in income have
adopted Simons's view. For example, in his 1963 article, Professor
Klein wrote,
The idea that gifts should be treated as income for tax purposes was
argued elaborately, articulately, and most forcefully by Simons in his
72 The late Dean Erwin Griswold wrote, "The economists have devoted a great
deal of thought to the definition of the concept of income, but it must be confessed
that it is difficult for a lawyer to get much concrete aid from their work." ERWIN N.
GRISWOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION

146 (6th ed. 1966).

73 SIMONS, supra note 5, at 128. This statement by Simons incorporates the principle of horizontal and vertical equity.
74 Id. at 56-57 (citations omitted).
75 See id. This is a prescient observation in light of the subsequent adoption of
the transferor's intent as the critical test for classification as a gift.
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classic work, Personal Income Taxation, published in 1938. Simons'
position is simply that for tax purposes there is no reason to distinguish gifts from other receipts: "it is hard to defend exclusion of
certain receipts merely because one has done nothing or given
nothing in return".... His attitude towards the taxation of gifts was
basically determined by his view that taxes must focus on the individual and that the best objective measure of equality of individuals
76
for tax purposes treats all forms of enrichment alike.
Klein pointed out that Simons's view of the proper definition of
income, including his view of the taxation of gifts, has been widely
77
accepted by economists.
In his 1978 article, Professor Dodge makes similar arguments for
including gifts in income and cites Simons and the Haig-Simons definition in support of that view. 78 Dodge states that "it is axiomatic that
receipts should be included in income regardless of source or
79
nature."
2.

Double Income Taxation

As previously noted,80 under the principles reflected in the HaigSimons definition of income, the justification for taxing income that is
accumulated, rather than spent in the year it was earned, subsumes an
assumption that the accumulated wealth will be spent on consumption in some future year and that the amount of the income currently
accumulated provides a fair approximation of the present value of the
future consumption. Of course, there is no means of predicting
whether the immediate taxpayer will be the one to use the accumulated funds to purchase services or goods at some future date or
whether some other person will use the funds to enjoy the future consumption. Thus, the tax laws are indifferent as to who uses the accumulated wealth for consumption purposes; it is sufficient to assume
that the wealth will be so used at a future date by someone, not necessarily by the current taxpayer.
The taxing of an individual's income entitles that individual to an
equivalent amount of consumption, either in the year that the income
is earned or in a future year, without incurring additional income
taxes. Even if consumption were not deemed to be the keystone to
the allocation of tax burden under the income tax system, and if "abil76
77
78
79
80

Klein, supra note 5, at 226 (citations omitted).
Id. at 227.
Dodge, supra note 5, at 1183-84.
Id. at 1184.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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ity to pay" were deemed the sole criteria, once a taxpayer has paid
income tax, the taxpayer should be permitted to employ that income
in any way the taxpayer desires without thereby incurring any additional income tax. If a taxpayer transfers previously taxed income to
someone else as a gift, can the taxpayer be deemed to have consumed
it by making that gift? If the gift does not constitute consumption by
the taxpayer, and if the gift is treated as taxable income to the donee,
then there would be two sets of income taxation on a single consumption-i.e., the only consumption that would take place would be the
consumption that occurs when the donee uses the donated property.
Prior to the 1938 publication of Simons's book, some commentators
characterized this treatment as "double taxation" and argued that gifts
should be excluded to prevent a duplication of the income tax.8 ' Professor Zelenak agrees that it is a double taxation, and that it can be
justified only if the transferor can be viewed as consuming the transferred property by making the gift;8 2 however, he ultimately concludes
that double taxation is appropriate for gifts. 8 3 Simons expressly rejects the contention that there is double taxation on the basis that the
gift itself is a kind of consumption by the transferor. Simons states,
If it is not more pleasant to give than to receive, one may still hesitate to assert that giving is not a form of consumption for the giver.
The proposition that everyone tries to allocate his consumption expenditure among different goods in such manner as to equalize the
utility of dollars-worths may not be highly illuminating; but there is
84
no apparent reason for treating gifts as an exception.
Professor Dodge acknowledged that the taxation of gifts "involves
'double taxation' in the economic sense in that the grantor is giving
after-tax dollars on which the recipient is again taxed," but Dodge
opines that the problems engendered by double taxation can be mitigated by some other means.8 5 Dodge states that, "the area of gifts ...
is not one where economic considerations should predominate over
principles of tax equity."8 6 Dodge distinguishes economic considerations from tax equity because he views the problem of double taxation
exclusively as one of hindering capital formation, which could be
cured by other means-i.e., he does not view the problem as one that
conflicts with the principles of the income tax itself. Dodge believes
81
82
83
84

85
86

See SIMONS, supra note 5, at 57; Warren, supra note 5, at 1088.
Zelenak, supra note 5, at 602.
Id. at 603.
SIMONS, supra note 5, at 57-58.
Dodge, supra note 5, at 1185-86.
Id. at 1186.
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that double taxation is warranted to preserve the proper measurement of the donee's income. 87 Dodge does state that, "[t] he giving of
a gift is more analogous to consumption than to investment."8 8 One
might counter that statement with the observation that gifts are far
from analogous to either one.
An important question then is whether a gift is a kind of consumption or something closely related to consumption. A gift does
not exhaust any societal resource, and therefore cannot be considered
even akin to a consumption. Consider the contrast between a gift of
cash or property to a donee and a payment to a third party for services
rendered. Take the example that Professor Klein set forth in his 1963
article to illustrate why he asserts that the intention of a transferor
should not affect the income tax treatment of the transfer:
[t]he argument attempts to establish a distinction based on the position of the donor rather than the donee. Surely no one would
argue that if Xpays his gardener 4000 dollars per year, the gardener
should not be taxed because doing so interferes with X's "right" to
use his property. The argument is equally without merit in the case
where X pays 4000 dollars per year to his son, out of pure love and
affection. While X probably does not want his son to be taxed, he is
not so concerned about the gardener. Tax consequences, however,
cannot be permitted to turn on considerations such as this.89
The same argument was made by Victor Thuronyi, who wrote:
it is not accurate to say that the gift is taxed twice. What is taxed is,
first, the amount [of income] earned by the donor and, second, the
amount transferred to the donee. The gift is taxed only once, to the
donee. Thus, a gift is no more subject to double taxation than is a
payment for personal services, which is also "taxed twice"-once
when earned by the payor and again when received by the payee.9 0
This argument is fallacious. Take the facts of Klein's example.
X's payment to the gardener is a cost of obtaining the gardener's services which were captured by X and used for his benefit to the exclusion of the rest of society. The gardener's services were a societal
resource that X consumed, so the payment is an expense for a consumption by X. Assume that the money that X used to pay the gardener was income that had been taxed to X. Having paid income tax
on that income, X is entitled to use it for consumption without incurring an additional income tax. But, X did use it to pay for a consump87 Id. at 1188-89.
88 Id. at 1186.
89 Klein, supra note 5, at 259.
90 Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REv. 45, 74 (1990).
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tion, and so X has obtained the consumption for which he was taxed.
When the gardener receives the payment, he is taxed on that income
because he can use it to purchase goods or services that he will capture for his exclusive benefit to the exclusion of the rest of society.
Taxing the gardener on the payment he receives does not constitute a
double counting of a single consumption. To the contrary, there are
two separate consumptions or future consumptions, and so it is
proper that there are two separate income tax impositions.
In contrast, when X makes a gift to his son, X has not consumed
any of society's resources by making that transfer. The consumption
will take place in the future when the son uses the donated property
to pay for a consumption or the son uses up the donated property
itself. It is the son's use of the property that is the consumption, not
X's gift to the son. Unlike the circumstance with the gardener, there
will be only one consumption, but, if the gift to the son were to be
included in his income, there would be two tax impositions on that
one consumption-once on X when he earned the income that was
the subject of the gift, and a second on the son when he received the
gift. The difference between the two circumstances could not be
more striking.
The fact that a transfer does not constitute a consumption does
not mean that the transfer necessarily must be free of a second tax. As
explained later,9 1 the decision not to tax a gift rests on a weighing of
two competing principles. In some circumstances, the facts that are
present may raise a third principle that points towards taxing the
transfer, or the facts may alter the weight to be accorded either of the
competing two principles so as to change the balance. Part III illustrates some circumstances in which a transfer of what otherwise would
be a gift should be taxed to the donee.
If the gift itself, in contrast to the donee's use of the donated
property, were to constitute a consumption by the donor, then the
case for taxing the transfer to the donee would be very strong. Professor Kornhauser argues that a gift does constitute a consumption by
the donor because "[t] he donor gets personal satisfaction from benefitting [sic] the recipient." 92 A donor's personal satisfaction does not
entail the use or destruction of an economic resource, which we maintain is the essence of a consumption. Kornhauser does not accept that
definition of consumption; as noted above, she maintains that the
"consumption" to which the Haig-Simons definition refers is the obtaining of a power to affect consumption. We, holding the view that
91

See supra Part |.C.4.

92

Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 30.
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even the taxation of accumulated income is a tax on future consumption, do not agree that psychic pleasure constitutes a consumption.9 3
Moreover, as discussed later in connection with examining the principle of permitting vicarious enjoyment,9 4 the psychic pleasure that the
donor derives from the transfer lies at the heart of the justification for
not taxing it.
In certain circumstances, a person's use of an economic resource
will be treated as a consumption even though the use is not preclusive
and does not result in the destruction of that resource. Consider the
following example. X creates a software program for computers. A
person can purchase the use of that program and have it sent to his
computer electronically, after which it can be used indefinitely by the
purchaser. The transaction is one in which the purchaser obtains a
permanent license to use the software. The purchaser's use of the
software does not remove anything from society's common store of
resources because the same program can be sent to the rest of the
world, and the purchaser's obtaining of the program does not deny
anyone else access to it. One might say that the specific electronic
transmission that the purchaser received was obtained exclusively by
that person, but it would be a stretch to classify that as a preclusive use
of a societal resource. Why then should the money paid by the purchaser to obtain a license for the use of the software be treated as a
consumption? When the software was created, that was a societal resource, a portion of which, in a simpler economy, could have been
taken by the government as a tax. However, even if we had an elementary economy, the government could not easily take a portion of
the software at the time of production because the producer would
still be free to license it to as many persons as the producer chooses.
While the government could restrict the number of persons to whom
the producer can license the software, and the government could go
into the business of licensing its share of the software, that is not a
viable solution. Instead, the government can take a dollar amount
which equals the value of a portion of the software, whose value can
best be determined by waiting to see the extent to which the producer
actually sells licenses to use it. In effect, the tax is deferred until licenses are sold, and the tax is imposed on the purchaser of each license by treating that purchase as a consumption of a portion of the
software. So, for tax purposes, a portion of the resource can be con93 As previously noted, Professor Warren's definition of "consumption" explicitly
precludes the pleasure derived from psychic benefits. See Warren, supra note 5, at
1084.
94 See supra Part I.C.3.
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sidered to have been consumed at the time that the license is purchased. The situation is quite different in the case of personal
satisfaction; in that case, no resource has been produced, and so none
can be consumed.
If personal satisfaction were characterized as consumption, than a
taxpayer who enjoyed personal satisfaction from the receipt of income
(i.e., the pure joy of seeing his bank account increase), would be
deemed to have consumed that income immediately upon receiving
it. That would prove too much; but, in any event, even if that characterization were adopted, it would not alter the analysis set forth in this
Article. A person who was deemed to have enjoyed a consumption
because of the personal satisfaction of receiving income nevertheless
would not be taxed again when the income is used to purchase the
preclusive use of a societal resource. Regardless of how the psychic
benefit obtained from receiving income is characterized, the taxpayer
is entitled to employ that income for the preclusive use of a societal
resource. Similarly, the psychic benefit derived from making a gift
does not erase the right to use those funds to purchase the preclusive
use of a societal resource.
As discussed later in this Article in connection with an examination of the income tax meaning of the term "gift," 95 a donor may derive benefits from the donee such as the latter's gratitude and
appreciation. Not all of those benefits can be described as psychic
pleasure because they may be converted into influence over the donee. In Part II of this Article, we explain why those benefits, and the
donor's possible anticipation of them, do not prevent a transfer from
qualifying as a gift, 96 and the same reasons explain why they do not
preclude the exclusion of such transfers from income. In short, one
reason is that the donee's gratitude and appreciation are not limited
societal resources, and so the "benefit" does not represent the consumption of a societal resource. But, there is a second reason that
applies even if our view that consumption requires the exhaustion of a
societal resource were rejected. The obtaining of gratitude and accompanying attitudes from the donee is an insubstantial benefit, and,
in most cases, it will be virtually impossible to determine whether that
was the motivating force for the transfer. The desire to provide the
donee with the means of consuming the income that was transferred
to the donee often will be the exclusive purpose of the transfer and
will virtually always be the dominant motive. As stated in the quote
above, Professor Kornhauser herself describes the benefit that the do95
96

See infra Part II.
See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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nor obtains as the personal satisfaction derived from benefiting the
donee. That personal satisfaction is incorporated in our contention
below that the taxation of income in the hands of the donor provides
the donor with the right to enjoy a consumption of the income either
by consuming it himself or by having the vicarious enjoyment of having another of his choice consume it.
A person (a "donee") may "gratuitously" perform services for another in the hope that the latter will thereby be induced to make a gift
of property. If a gift of property is made subsequently, does the donor's consumption of the donee's services satisfy the one-consumption principle so that the donee should be taxed on the gift? Our
answer is no. In virtually all such cases, the value of the donee's services will be vastly less than the amount of the gift (otherwise, it would
not be a profitable venture for the donee), and so most of the transfer
cannot be matched to a consumption of the donee's services. Thus,
only a small portion of the transfer can be matched by a consumption
and so taxed to the donee, and the administrative burden of ascertaining the identity and value of those services would be enormous, if indeed it is even feasible. More importantly, a donee may have
gratuitously performed the services with no ulterior selfish motives,
and that is the most likely scenario in all but a few circumstances. The
relationship of the parties makes gratuitous motives highly plausible.
Cross giving is a common occurrence, and one gift is not deemed
compensation for the other. It would be impossible in most cases to
determine the motives that the donee possessed, and the reasonable
presumption is that the donee's actions were not selfishly motivated.
Professor Kornhauser also points out that a donor might continue to use the donated property. 9 7 For example, if a donor (Y)
makes a gift of an automobile to a spouse (Z), both might enjoy the
use of the car. It is difficult to see the significance of that observation
to the issue at hand. If Ydid not make a gift of the car but retained it
in I's name, both spouses might well use the car jointly. The use of
the car by Z in that case would not likely be treated as a taxable event
even by those who would tax gifts. Y'sjoint use of the car after gifting
it to Z is equally irrelevant.
The reason for not taxing Y's gift of the car to Z is that the consumption of the car takes place when it is used, not by its transfer. I's
joint use of the car after making the gift does not make the transfer
itself a consumption by Y. If the car is consumed by the use of both Y
and Z, there still is only one consumption that takes place, and there
should be only a single income tax. The only relevance to Y'sjoint use
97

Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 30.
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of the car is to the question of who, between Yand Z, should bear the
incidence of the single income tax, but because the current tax
scheme places the incidence of the tax on Y, Y's use of the car does
not detract from that decision.
An additional reason for not treating a joint use of the car as a
justification for taxing the gift is the adoption of a single unit concept,
which is discussed later in the Article. 9 Under a single unit concept,
which, in fairness, it should be noted that Professor Kornhauser rejects, the use of the car by both spouses would be irrelevant.
What is wrong with having two income tax impositions for a single consumption? The answer is that there is nothing wrong with it if
there is a compelling policy goal that is furthered by such double taxation. The difficulty here is that, on balance, income tax policy considerations either weigh in favor of a single income tax imposition or, at
least, are in equilibrium on that issue.
3.

Vicarious Enjoyment of Another's Consumption

Let us consider X's gift to his son, and again assume that the gift
is of accumulated income on which X has been taxed. As previously
noted, having paid tax on that income, X is entitled to expend an
equivalent amount on consumption without incurring an additional
income tax. But X decides that he does not wish to consume any
more for himself. Instead, he wishes to enjoy vicariously a consumption by someone he loves, his son. As Simons might have put it, Xwill
derive greater utility from enjoying his son's consumption than from
consuming an item himself. The gift to the son implements X's wish,
but it will be partially frustrated to the extent the son is taxed on the
gift, thereby reducing the net amount that passes to him, so that the
son cannot purchase the same amount of consumption that X could
have. The question then is whether the income tax system should permit a taxpayer to use the full amount of income on which he has paid
income tax to enjoy vicariously a consumption by a loved one, or
whether the system should permit a full amount of consumption only
by the taxpayer himself. While either solution is possible, to allow the
taxpayer to enjoy vicariously another's consumption is consistent with
the tax policy of taxing accumulated income on the assumption that
someone, not necessarily the taxpayer, will use the accumulated funds
to pay for a consumption at some future date. In addition, providing
the taxpayer the option of vicarious consumption implements the economic goal of minimizing the extent to which the tax system de98

See infra Part I.C.6.
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presses the incentive to produce goods or services that will be
converted into income.
The above analysis is not altered if X had not previously been
taxed on the property donated to the son. If X obtained the property
through a chain of gifts in which the original donor had been taxed
on the property as income, the principle that someone in the chain of
gifts should be permitted to consume the donated property without
incurring an additional income tax would apply with equal force as
when X himself was taxed on the income. If the donated property
had appreciated in X's hands (and so the appreciation had not been
taxed to X), the donee will be taxed on that appreciation when it is
realized and recognized, so there will be only one tax and one consumption. If X had inherited the donated property, which was not
income in respect of a decedent, and if the property had been appreciated in the hands of the decedent from whom X inherited it, that
appreciation will never be taxed to anyone because § 1014 of the
Code provides X with a basis in the property equal to its value, typically determined at the time of the decedent's death. 99 Should the
appreciated portion of the property for which X had obtained a
stepped-up basis be taxed to the donee since there will be no double
taxation of that portion of the donated property? The answer again is
no. Section 1014 of the Code incorporates the policy that the appreciated portion of the inherited property would not be taxed to X as
income if he sold or consumed the property. So, under Code § 1014,
X is entitled to consume the inherited property or the proceeds from
the sale of that property without incurring an income tax. If, instead
of consuming it himself, Xelects to enjoy vicariously the consumption
of that property by someone of X's choosing, that should not cause
income taxation of the consumption any more than X's personal consumption would have done so. Similarly, if all or a portion of the
donated property were the product of tax-exempt income that X received (e.g., income from a state bond that is exempt from tax under
§ 103 of the Code), X should be permitted to have the income consumed by someone of his choice.
4.

Choice Between Competing Principles

The determination of the correct tax treatment of gifts raises two
competing tax principles or goals. One principle is that the individual
who has been taxed on income should have a virtually unrestricted
range of choices as to how that income will be used to purchase con99

I.R.C. § 1014 (2000).
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sumption. The other principle is that an individual's taxable income
should include all his receipts (other than a return of capital) so as to
reflect accurately his ability to share the costs of government. It is not
possible in the gift setting to adopt a tax rule that will comply with
both principles. One must yield to the other. Congress chose to give
priority to the principle of providing the taxpayer with a wider range
of choices for consumption. A gift is excluded from a donee's income
because of that commitment to the donor; the exclusion has nothing
to do with the worthiness of the donee. Several commentators would
prefer that priority be given to the principle of maximizing the accuracy of the measurement of a donee's ability to pay. While that is not
an irrational choice, it is no more reasonable than the opposite choice
that Congress made, and may well be less compelling. As discussed
below, the congressional treatment of gifts comports with a concept of
treating certain parties as a single tax unit for limited tax purposes.
Even some of the commentators who urge that gifts should be
included in income, acknowledge that there are circumstances when
they should not be or when some amount of them should not be.
One example is that administrative expediency requires that minor
items be excluded.' 0 0 It would not be feasible to attempt to tax small
everyday occurrences such as having friends over for dinner or making a wedding gift of modest value.
5.

Support Payments

Payments in satisfaction of an obligation to support another are
not gifts, 1 1 but their exclusion from income would seem desirable,
albeit some commentators would impose limits on the amount excluded. 0 2 The satisfaction of a legal obligation of support, such as
the payment of schooling expenses of a minor child, constitutes a consumption by the payor, and, even though the supported person benefits from that expenditure, only one income tax should be imposed. It
is reasonable to treat the person obligated to provide the support and
the object of that obligation as a single tax unit for purposes of the
income tax. The local law's imposition on the payor of a legal obligation to pay for the support expenses of the beneficiary effectively
treats the payor and the beneficiary as a single economic unit for that
100 See Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 36; see also SIMONS, supra note 5, at 135; Dodge,
supra note 5, at 1192.
101 They are legally required payments and so are not motivated by detached and
disinterested generosity, however much the payor may love the recipient. See Dodge,
supra note 5, at 1202.
102 See id. at 1206-08.
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purpose, and it is appropriate for the tax law likewise to treat those
expenses as a consumption by a single taxable unit. Only one consumption took place, and so it is appropriate to impose only one income tax.
The tax law's treatment of alimony does not conflict with our view
of how support should be treated. Prior to 1942, alimony payments
were not income to the payee. 10 3 In 1942, shortly after the onset of
World War II, Congress made alimony payments taxable to the payee
and deductible by the payor; 10 4 and that scheme has continued to be
the tax law's treatment of alimony.10 5 The current tax treatment imposes only a single income tax on income used to pay alimony since
the amount included in the payee's income is matched by the
nonitemized deduction allowable to the payor. 106 The two provisions
together (§§ 71 and 215 of the Code) constitute the means of implementing the income-splitting scheme that Congress has provided for
divorced couples, and do not impose double taxation.
6.

Single Tax Unit

Dodge acknowledges that transfers between spouses might be ex1 07
empted on the ground that the two spouses make a single tax unit.
Without deciding the question, Klein notes that an immediate family
might be regarded as a single tax unit for tax purposes so that transfers within the unit are of no tax significance.1 08 But, there is no good
reason to limit the single unit concept to spouses or members of an
immediate family. The make-up of what constitutes a family has
changed in recent years. Many people who are not married live together in a family-type setting. 10 9 The delineation of a single tax unit
should not depend upon formal relationships, such as marriage and
blood kinship. The current tax definition of gifts provides an excel103

Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 152 (1917); see Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 8

(1935) (explaining that alimony payments to a divorced wife are not considered income of the wife).
104 WILLIAM ANDREWS, BASIc FEDERAL
105 I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (2000).
106 Id. §§ 62(a)(10), 71,215.

INCOME TAXATION

130 (5th ed. 1999).

107 See Dodge, supra note 5, at 1203. Simons seems to believe that some sort of
accommodation should be made for certain gifts among family members, but he does
not resolve just what that should be, and it probably would not be extensive.

SIMoNs,

supra note 5, at 143 n.5.
108

Klein, supra note 5, at 253.
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lent standard for determining whether two people should be regarded
as a single unit for certain tax purposes.
When a transferor makes a transfer to another out of "detached
and disinterested generosity," the effect of current tax law is to treat
the transferor and the transferee as members of a single tax unit for
certain (but not for all) purposes. One member of the unit (the donor) will have been taxed on the income from which the donated
property is derived, and the other member of the unit is permitted to
use the donated property for consumption without incurring any income tax thereby. The separate identities of the parties are ignored
for this very limited purpose. The delineation of the tax unit is made
by looking to the intention of the transferor. If a donor makes a transfer out of detached and disinterested generosity, out of love and affection, the act itself demonstrates that the relationship between the
donor and the donee is sufficiently meaningful to warrant regarding
them as a single unit for certain limited tax purposes. The test rests
on the nature of the relationship of the parties to each other as indicated by the transferor's action and intention rather than on some
formal bonds. As already noted, since the donor previously paid the
tax on the income that was given to the donee, it is appropriate to
allow the donor to choose whose consumption will provide the donor
with the vicarious enjoyment from which the donor will derive the
most satisfaction; the single unit concept accomplishes that objective.
This latter consideration is the justification for treating two persons as
a single tax unit; the transferor's intent is the key to identifying the
parties who should be so treated.
The single unit is defined by the intentions and wishes of the
donor. We will explore later in this Article whether, in certain circumstances, the actions of a transferee should prevent the utilization of
the single unit concept despite the donative intentions of the
transferor.
Even if a donor barely knows the donee, but chooses to make the
gift because the donee's consumption would provide the donor with
optimum utility from the use of the property, the donor's choice
should not be partially frustrated by taxing the donee. For example,
X learns from a newspaper story that Y's parents were killed by a terrorist attack, and that Yhas financial needs as a consequence. X, who
has never met Y or any of her family, is touched by her plight. X
sends Y$2000 as a gift. The absence of a relationship between X and
Y does not alter the facts that X desires to have his $2000 used by Y,
and that Xwill derive more satisfaction from Ys consumption than he
would from using the $2000 for his own consumption. For a very lim-
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ited tax purpose, X and Y should be considered a single tax unit so
that only one income tax is imposed.
.The single unit concept is reflected in the manner in which a
donee's basis in donated property is determined. As noted previously,
the general rule is that the basis that the donor had in the donated
property immediately before the gift was made becomes the basis of
the donee.1 10 The limitation on the donee's basis for purposes of determining losses reflects an overriding concern of Congress not to
permit one party to transfer a built-in loss to another. The general
scheme though is one of a single tax unit-i.e., a single investment for
the unit as a whole.
The single unit and single investment concept was adopted by the
Supreme Court in its 1929 decision in Taft v. Bowers.111 In that case,
in connection with the determination of a donee's basis in stock acquired by gift and subsequently sold by the donee, the Court held that
the statute establishing the transferred basis rule for gifts is constitutional.11 2 The Court stated, "In truth the stock represented only a
single investment of capital-that made by the donor. And when
through sale or conversion the increase was separated therefrom, it
became income from that investment in the hands of the recipient
subject to taxation .... 11

Professor Kornhauser contends that single unit treatment is improper except for parties who are otherwise part of the same family
unit for tax purposes. She states, "It is simply inequitable and inconsistent to treat [a donor and donee] as the same taxable unit for some
tax purposes and not others."11 4 She would limit the single unit treatment to gifts between spouses who file a joint return and between a
parent and children under the age of fourteen. 15 Professor Zelenak
agrees with Kornhauser on this issue and states that a single taxable
unit "is not an absurd position, but with respect to all transferees
other than spouses and children under age 14, it is fundamentally inconsistent with how taxable units are defined for other purposesmost importantly, for determining rates and exemptions." ' 16
110 I.R.C. § 1015(a). The policy considerations for the addition to basis for gift
taxes that were incurred is discussed later in this Article. See infra Part III.
111 278 U.S. 470, 482-84 (1929).
112 Id. at 484.
113 Id. at 482.
114 Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 36.
115 Id. at 36-37. The age of tinder fourteen was chosen because that is the age at
which the "Kiddie Tax" causes a child's unearned (i.e., passive) income to be taxed at
the parent's marginal rate. See I.R.C. § I (g).
116 Zelenak, supra note 5, at 603.
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Is it true that the treatment of persons as a single unit for some
tax purposes and not for others is unique as to gifts? There are a
number of stock attribution rules in the Code (§§ 26 7 (c) and 318 are
two examples) in which individuals and some fictional entities are
treated as a single unit for certain limited tax purposes (for the purpose of treating each as owning the stock of another) but not for
other tax purposes. Section 707(b)(3) of the Code provides attribution rules for partnership interests. The single tax unit concept is the
underlying justification for the loss disallowance rules of §§ 267(a) (1)
and 707(b) (1) of the Code. Zelenak does note that the stock attribution rules and loss disallowance rules "could be viewed as minor exceptions"'1 17 to the absence of a single unit approach in the tax law.
Why are those provisions "minor" exceptions and apparently desirable
ones, but the single unit concept for gifts a "major" exception and an
undesirable one?
Moreover, those are not the only circumstances in which the tax
law provides single unit treatment for some purposes and not for
others. Even as to the tax rate applied to children under the age of
fourteen, while their unearned (i.e., passive) income is taxed at their
parent's marginal rate, their earned income is not and so the children
and their parents are treated as a single tax unit for some tax rate
purposes, but not for others. In addition, the entire scheme of Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code, dealing with the taxation of
partnerships and partners, is laced with circumstances in which the
partners are sometimes treated as separate individuals who have
pooled their resources and are sometimes treated in the aggregate as
a single entity. 1 8 The genius of Subchapter K is that Congress decided that it would not commit to one treatment, but would treat the
partnership as an entity when the subject involved made that appropriate and treat the partnership as a collection of individuals when
that was appropriate. Congress took to heart the admonition of Ralph
Waldo Emerson that, "[a] foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little
minds."119

Indeed, the concept of a partnership as an entity is itself an example of a single unit. A and B, who are not related, form a service
partnership in which they will divide the income equally between
them. A brings in twice as much income as B does. The equal divi117
118

Id. at 603 n.15.
I.R.C. §§ 701-777.

119 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS, FIRST SERIES 57 (1865); see also William Allen
White, A PasteJewel, EMPORIA GAZETTE, Nov. 17, 1923, at 2 ("Consistency is a paste
jewel that only cheap men cherish.").
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sion of the profits shifts income that A earned to B. Under usual income tax rules, a diversion of income earned by one person to
another would be disallowed, but the single tax unit treatment of the
partnership overrides that rule. A and B are treated as a single unit
for some tax purposes, but not for others.
The treatment of a donor and donee as a single tax unit for some
limited tax purposes is not an extraordinary concept that departs from
the normal tax scheme. It is merely one of a significant number of tax
provisions that are grounded on the single unit concept.
Having rejected the single unit concept, Professor Kornhauser argues that the donor of appreciated property should realize and recognize a gain equal to the amount of appreciation. I20 While that is a
plausible treatment, assuming that constitutional rules are not a barrier, as they appear not to be, the single unit concept points in another direction. Also, our position that the donor should be
permitted to enjoy vicariously the consumption of the full amount of
the accumulated income on which a tax has been paid would be partially frustrated if the gift were to accelerate the realization of appreciation of the donated asset.
Because the donor and donee retain their separate identities for
other tax purposes, the transferred basis provision permits the donor
to shift the tax incidence on appreciation of the asset to the donee. It
seems likely that most gifts of appreciated property will be made to a
donee who is in a lower income tax bracket than the donor, so that
the transfer of the asset will result in a reduction of the tax levy on a
sale of the asset. To prevent that from taking place, Congress could
have provided that the donee's gain on a disposition of the donated
asset would be taxed to the donor to the extent attributable to the
appreciation at the time of the gift.' 2 1 Alternatively, it could be taxed
to the donee at the marginal tax rate at which it would have been
taxed to the donor. 12 2 Apparently, Congress decided that the amount
of revenue obtainable from protecting the progressive rates on the
donated property was insufficient to justify undertaking the burden of
120 Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 37. In his recommendations for tax reform,
Simons also urged that a donor be taxed on the amount of appreciation of donated
property. HENRY C. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 44 (1950).
121 Compare I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) for a similar approach that was adopted by
Congress to deal with the circumstance in which appreciated property was contributed by one partner to a partnership which subsequently distributed the property to
another partner.
122 This approach was adopted in the so-called "Kiddie Tax" provision. Id. § 1 (g);
see KAHN, supra note 10, at 705-11.
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administering a regime of that nature, and so Congress has allowed
the tax incidence to be shifted.
7.

A Deduction for the Donor

Even if it is agreed that there should be a single income tax on
donated property, that does not prove that the gift should be excluded from the donee's income. By excluding the gift from income,
the incidence of the income tax is left with the donor who incurred
that tax before making the gift. An alternative approach would be to
shift the incidence of tax to the donee. That could be accomplished
by including the gift in the donee's income, but allowing the donor a
nonitemized tax deduction for the gift. While only a single income
tax would then be imposed, the incidence would be on the donee.
The reason for rejecting that approach is that it would greatly impair
the goal of progressive taxation (i.e., the system of taxation under
which tax rates rise as income increases). If the tax incidence were
shifted to the donee, it would permit a high bracket taxpayer to shift
income to a lower tax bracket donee. One might contend that the
shifting of the incidence of tax to the donee does not distort progressivity because the incidence properly belongs on the donee. The
problem with that view is that the availability of using gifts as a means
of reducing the tax burden on income would be a powerful incentive
to make gifts that otherwise would not take place. The potential for
stimulating large gifts to low bracket donees would create a serious
rupture in the progressive rate structure. The problem is similar to
the one encountered when a donor transfers previously earned but
untaxed income, and the courts fashioned the "anticipatory assignment of income" doctrine to prevent manipulation of the tax rate
123
structure by that device.
Although the basis transfer rules that now exist permit a shifting
of the tax incidence on appreciation to a lower bracket donee, the
extent of the injury to progressivity suffered thereby is of much less
consequence than the injury that would be suffered if the tax law were
to permit wholesale shifting of the tax incidence on all income, including personal service income. For administrative reasons, Congress is willing to allow a relatively small inroad into progressivity for
the appreciated portion of donated property, but it is not willing to
allow an expansive escape route for all earned income, especially since
there is no administrative benefit from granting the donor a deduction. The denial of a deduction to the donor protects the integrity of
123

See KAHN, supra note 10, at 692-98.
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the progressive rate structure. The shifting of tax incidence from the
payor of alimony to the payee 124 has special purposes (such as relief
from the added cost incurred when a single household is split into two
households) that do not exist in the typical gift situation.
8.

Gift Tax Imposition as Double Taxation

The making of a gift could cause the imposition of a gift tax.
Does the possible imposition of a gift tax refute our contention that a
taxpayer who has paid an income tax should be allowed to enjoy vicariously the consumption paid for by that income without incurring additional income tax costs and that Congress has chosen to implement
that principle and the single unit concept? We do not believe that it
does. In making tax rules, Congress often is faced with a need to
choose among competing and irreconcilable principles or goals. In
choosing between the principle of providing a taxpayer with great latitude in selecting the consumption to be purchased with accumulated
income and the principle of obtaining an accurate measurement of a
donee's ability to pay, Congress selected the former. The gift tax
serves an entirely different set of goals. 125 We will not examine in this
Article the several functions and goals of the gift tax. Suffice it to say
that Congress determined that the functions and goals of the gift tax
are more important than protecting the donor's choice of consumption, and Congress is willing therefore to impose a tax cost on the
transfer of a large amount of property even though that can be seen as
a reduction of the consumption available to the donee. 126 The fact
that Congress gave priority to gift tax goals does not mean that Congress should give priority to other principles with which the single
unit concept and the optimum utility of consumption goal come into
124 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
125 A major reason for having estate taxes is to reduce large concentrations of
wealth. See DouGLAs A. KAHN ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF Girs, TRUSTS, AND EsTATES 9 (3d ed. 1997). Another reason, suggested by Professor Graetz is that transfer
taxes add a measure of progressivity to the income tax by taxing wealth that may have
escaped income taxation. Gift taxes serve two important functions. They complement estate taxes by imposing a cost on lifetime transfers so that death taxes cannot
be completely avoided by that means. They also complement progressivity in the income tax by imposing a cost on transfers, which can result in the subsequent income
from the transferred property being taxed to the donee at lower marginal tax rates.
Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE LJ. 259, 270-73

(1983).
126 Even when the donor pays the gift tax, as often is the case, it can be seen as a
reduction of the amount available to the donee. The amount of the payment is lost to
both parties. Were no gift tax imposed, that amount could have been added to the
donee's gift.
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conflict. Note that the gift tax applies only to gifts of large amounts
1 27
and many gifts pass to donees without any gift tax being imposed.
The gift tax, therefore, does not impact the income tax treatment of
gifts in most gift transactions.
II.

THE MEANING OF THE TERM "GIFT" FOR GIFT
EXCLUSION PURPOSES

The standard for determining whether a voluntary transfer without adequate consideration constitutes a gift is whether the donor had
the requisite intention of "detached and disinterested generosity."
But, just how detached and disinterested must the donor's intention
be? Also, are there circumstances when the role or actions of the
transferee should prevent gift treatment, regardless of the donor's intent? These questions, and others concerning the scope of the gift
exclusion, come into sharp focus when examined in the context of the
facts of the Ninth Circuit case of 01k v. United States.1 28 We will first set
forth the facts of the 01k case, both substantive and procedural, and
then consider the scope of the term "gift" in the context of that case.
The taxpayer in 01k was a craps dealer in two Las Vegas gambling
casinos. 129 Dealers were forbidden to fraternize with patrons of the
casinos and were required to treat all patrons equally and show no
preferences.' 3 0 The monies used to make bets at the casinos were referred to as "tokes. '"13 From time to time, some patrons would give
tokes to the dealer or place a bet for him.' 3 2 The tokes so received by
a dealer were combined with the tokes received by other dealers, and
the total was divided among them equally.' 3- A dealer would be fired
if he kept a toke rather than placing it in the common fund.V4 The
management of the casino permitted this practice but did not en127 Putting aside the marital and charitable deductions, there is an annual exclusion for gifts of present interests to each donee. I.R.C. § 2503(b). At this writing the

annual amount that can be excluded for each donee is $11,000, and, if spouses join
together in the gift, the amount excluded is $22,000 per donee per year. Rev. Proc.
2001-59, § 3.19(1), 2001-52 I.R.B. 623; see I.R.C. § 2513. Also, amounts paid for education or medical care of an individual are exempt. Id. § 2503(e). In addition, subject to a dollar limitation, a unified credit insulates gifts not exempted by the

exclusion from gift taxation. Id. § 2505. For gifts made at the time of this writing, the
credit will insulate $1,000,000 from gift taxes. Id. § 2505 (a) (1).
128 536 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1976).
129 Id. at 877.

130
131
132
133
134

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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courage it because tokes that the dealers received were taken out of

the pool of money used to make bets. 135 No more than 5% to 10% of
the patrons gave tokes to dealers. 136 The dealers performed no services for patrons that would be compensable.1 37 Dealers anticipated
receiving some amount of tokes, and their receipt was fairly regular
and predictable.' 38 The taxpayer averaged about $30 a day in such
39
receipts.I
The taxpayer contended that the tokes he received were gifts and
so were exempt from income tax. 140 The case was tried before a District Court, 14 1 which held for the taxpayer, and the Government ap-

pealed to the Ninth Circuit. 142 Two of the District Court's findings
(numbered seventeen and eighteen) made the Government's task on
appeal more difficult than the facts of the case otherwise would have
suggested. Those two findings were,
17. The tokes are given to dealers as a result of impulsive generosity
or superstition on the part of players, and not as a form of compen-

sation for services.
18. Tokes are the result of detached and disinterested generosity on
14 3
the part of a small number of patrons.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court and held that the
tokes were taxable. 14 4 While the court reached the correct result, the
court's discussion of the issues is questionable and presents a backdrop for examining the correct meaning of the term "gift."
The Ninth Circuit accepted the finding that the tokes were given
out of "impulsive generosity or superstition on the part of the players."' 45 The court then said,
However our understanding also requires us to acknowledge that
payments so motivated are not acts of "detached or disinterested
generosity." Quite the opposite is true. Tributes to the gods of fortune which it is hoped will be returned bounteously soon can only
1 46
be described as an "involved and intensely interested" act.
135

Id.

136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 876-77.
140 Id. at 878.
141 Olk v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Nev. 1975), revd,536 F.2d 876 (9th
Cir. 1976).
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Olk, 536 F.2d at 876.
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Id. at 877.
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Id. at 876.
Id. at 879.
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Id.
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This conclusion raises the question of the meaning of the "detached and disinterested" standard-just how detached and how disinterested must the transferor be?
One possible construction is that the terms are to be applied
strictly so that a transferor can have no motives of a selfish or selfserving nature. That construction cannot be correct, because it would
mean that there would be virtually no transfers that qualify as gifts,
and Congress surely did not intend the statutory exclusion for gifts to
have no meaningful consequence. The psychological make-up of
human beings is complex. There often are mixed motives for making
voluntary transfers. "Gifts" do provide benefits to a donor, even
though no legal obligations are attached. The donor secures the gratitude and affection of the donee. Even if the donor gets no more
than a smile and thanks, those are benefits. The gift may cause the
donee to feel indebted to the donor to do something in return. A
donee may be constrained to accede to the donor's wishes on matters
arising subsequently because of the moral debt that the donee may
feel he owes to the donor. To some extent, the gift empowers the
donor with a kind of moral suasion over the donee. Of course, not
every donee will feel a moral obligation or gratitude for receiving a
gift. 147 But most will, and it is reasonable for a donor to anticipate
that the donee will respond in that fashion. Should a donor's expectation of enhanced affection and obedience negate the classification
of the transfer as a gift? There seems little doubt that the correct
answer is no. If that were not true, only saints could make gifts, and
probably few even of them. The test cannot require totally unselfish
motives. It should be sufficient to require that the predominant motive be one that is unselfish. Moreover, the virtual impossibility of determining in most cases whether a donor had such expectations or
cared a wit about them makes that construction infeasible to
administer.
There is no limitation on the number of persons towards whom
an individual can feel goodwill or affection. Obtaining the appreciation of a donee does not deprive society of any resource that otherwise
would be available. In other words, no societal resource has been consumed. Nevertheless, such considerations are not devoid of relevance. The exclusion of gifts from income is grounded on permitting
the donor to have the vicarious pleasure of having another consume
the income on which the donor has been taxed. If the donor's primary motive is not to vicariously enjoy the donee's consumption, but
rather is to purchase an attitude from the donee, then the condition
147

Two of King Lear's daughters are prominent examples.
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that justifies granting an exclusion is not present. Even though there
has been no consumption of a societal resource, gift treatment should
be denied. As previously discussed, the gift exclusion rests on a balancing of two competing principles. In judging that balance, the principle of permitting a transferor a wide latitude to determine who will
consume his income should be given little weight when the primary
motive of the transferor is not for that purpose. However, as already
discussed, gift treatment should be denied only where the primary
motive of the donor is selfish. There will be very few circumstances in
which that will be true.
To return to the facts of the Olk case, was the "impulsive generosity" of the patrons, which probably was the product of the euphoria of
winning, any different from the disinterested generosity that the Duberstein test requires? The only difference seems to be that the district
court's seventeenth finding indicates that the patrons' motives also
had an element of a superstitious hope that the "gift" would induce
the gods of chance to smile on their adventure. While the district
court's finding is worded in the disjunctive, which might suggest that
the court meant that some patrons were motivated by impulsive generosity and others by superstition, it seems clear that the finding does
not have that meaning. If a patron wished to make a tribute to the
gods, how does a transfer of tokes to a dealer accomplish that purpose? The transfer must have been at least partially motivated by a
desire to enrich the dealer. No transfer was made exclusively for the
purpose of placating the gods. Even where a patron did harbor a superstitious motive, the court did not find that it was the dominant
motive. It seems far more likely that the tokes were given to the dealers primarily under the influence of the euphoria of the moment, and
that a superstitious hope that the gift would win the favor of Lady
Luck did not carry much weight. Consider the analogous motivations
of a donor who makes a gift to a church. The issue there is whether
the gift qualifies for a charitable deduction. 4 8 We will discuss later
the extent to which a different definition of gift is warranted for charitable donations than the one used for the gift exclusion, 49 but in this
context, the meanings should be similar. A donor may hope that his
gift to the church will help pave the way for his ascension to heaven.
He may hope that the gift will cause God to smile on his endeavors
and bring prosperity and health to him and his family. Even if the
donor harbors such feelings, they would not prevent the contribution
148 A deduction is allowed by I.R.C. § 170 for gifts to a qualified charitable organization. See I.R.C. § 170 (2000).
149

See infra Part IV.
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to the church from qualifying as a gift. Motives of that nature are too
insubstantial, and their presence too difficult to prove to be given any
weight in determining a donor's dominant motive for making a gift.
The patrons who gave tokes to the taxpayer in 01k are in essentially
the same position in that respect.
The eighteenth finding of the district court-that the transfer of
the tokes was the result of "detached and disinterested generosity"would seem to have bound the court of appeals to affirm, unless it
could legitimately conclude that the trial court had used an incorrect
standard or that its finding was "clearly erroneous." Judge Sneed, who
wrote the opinion in 01k and who is a prominent tax authority in his
own right, 150 disregarded that eighteenth finding on the ground that
it was an application of the Duberstein1 5 standard to the facts of 01k,
and therefore was a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact,
and so the "clearly erroneous" standard of review was inapplicable. 152
Judge Sneed's reasoning on this issue is contrary to Supreme Court
holdings. In Kaiser and Duberstein, the Supreme Court held that a trial
court's or jury's application of the "detached and disinterested generosity" 15 3 standard to the facts of a case is to be treated as a finding of

fact and subject to the standard of review that applies to factual findings. 154 While the Supreme Court could have established a different
standard of review, the one it chose is not unique for the review of
"findings" of that nature. There are other examples of applying a
"clearly erroneous" standard of review to a trial court's "finding,"
which consists of an application of a legal standard to a set of facts
(sometimes called a mixed question of fact and law). A finding of
negligence is a prime example. The determination that a defendant
was negligent is an application of a legal standard to a set of facts, and
the standard of review for that determination is the one applicable to
factual findings.
Under the restrictive findings that the District Court made in 01k,
it would not seem possible to find that the donors lacked the requisite
intention for the tokes to be gifts. Why then did the court feel so
strongly that the tokes were not gifts that Judge Sneed was willing to
150 2 WHO's WHO IN AMERICA 2620 (44th ed. 1986-1987) (describingJudge Sneed,
who was a prominent tax professor for many years and was Dean of Duke Law
School).
151 Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
152 Olk v. United States, 536 F.2d 876, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1976).

153

Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285 (quoting Comm'r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246

(1956)).
154 See United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 304-05 (1960); Duberstein, 363 U.S. at

290-91.
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pronounce such questionable conclusions? The answer lies in the
role that the taxpayer (the dealer) had in the scenario. Consider the
following language from the opinion in 01k:
Moreover, in applying the statute to the findings of fact, we are not
permitted to ignore those findings which strongly suggest that tokes
in the hands of the ultimate recipients are viewed as a receipt indistinguishable, except for erroneously anticipated tax differences,
from wages. The regularity of the flow, the equal division of the
receipts, and the daily amount received indicated that a dealer acting reasonably would come to regard such receipts as a form of
compensation for his services. The manner in which a dealer may
regard tokes is, of course, not the touchstone for determining
whether the receipt is excludable from gross income. It is, however,
a reasonable and relevant inference well-grounded in the findings
of facts.

155

At a minimum, the Ninth Circuit was greatly influenced in its decision by the role that the taxpayer (the transferee) had in the transaction. Indeed, it seems highly likely that it was the transferee's role,
rather than the intention of the transferors, that led the court to hold
that the tokes were taxable. It seems likely that the court refrained
from stating its true reasons for its decision because it thought that
the Supreme Court's decision in Duberstein precluded that approach.
It also seems likely that the court expected the Supreme Court to review the Olk case and to modify its Duberstein rule.
The Ninth Circuit is not alone in believing that Duberstein established the transferor's intent as the exclusive test for gift treatment.
But the Supreme Court's decision was made in a factual context in
which no competing principles were invoked that might have led the
Court to modify that test. 156 In a subsequent case presenting facts that
do invoke a competing principle, a court could decide whether that
competing principle carries sufficient weight to justify a modification
of the Duberstein rule.
The better approach would be to recognize that there are circumstances where the role or actions of the transferee will prevent a transfer from qualifying as a gift, even though the transferor holds the
requisite intention for a gift. This approach recognizes that the decision to exclude gifts rests on a balancing of competing principles, and
the actions of a transferee in certain circumstances will enhance the
weight to be accorded to what otherwise would be the subordinated
155

O/k, 536 F.2d at 879.

156

Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285, 286 (relying solely on the transferor's intent test for

support).
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principle. In short, there are certain circumstances where the focus
should be on the transferee rather than on the transferor. The Olk
case provides a good example of the type of situation in which the
role of the transferee should control.
Consider some other examples. X fraudulently disguises himself
to appear seriously handicapped and impoverished. Using that disguise, and sitting on a busy corner of a large city, X induces passersby
to "give" him money, the total of which comes to a large sum. The
people who gave X the money did so out of sympathy for his plight
and out of detached and disinterested generosity. Nevertheless, the
donations made to X are income to him. He obtained the donative
intent of the transferors through fraudulent action, and he should not
be allowed to obtain a tax benefit thereby. The fraudulent act of the
transferee invokes another principle (the principle that a person
should not be permitted to benefit from his own wrongdoing), and
that principle overrides the considerations that underlie the provision
for the exclusion of gifts. But that case is easy. Let us look at a more
difficult one.
Y, who lost his legs in an accident some years ago, is a professional beggar. He occupies a space on a busy street in a large city and
collects "donations" from passersby. Ymakes no false representations,
either explicitly or implicitly. Y succeeds in collecting a substantial
amount of donations, and lives well from what he receives. The donations are made by persons who have the requisite donative intent for a
gift. But Yis a professional donee. Should the gift exclusion be available to a person who derives a living from soliciting and receiving gifts
from strangers? That is a difficult question. An adult individual who
obtains a good living from receiving a monthly allowance from a parent does not have income from those gifts. The position of the professional beggar has many similarities to that of the adult child, but there
is a meaningful difference in their circumstances in that the beggar
solicits donations from strangers. In our view, and this is a close case,
Y should be taxed on the donations. This is a case where the balancing of the two competing principles (the principle of maximizing the
choice of consumption for the donor and the principle of accurately
measuring each individual's ability to pay) may warrant a different
outcome, because the latter principle carries more weight in this circumstance than it usually does. When a transferee makes a profession
out of collecting gifts from strangers, the erosion to the proper measurement of income takes on greater significance than it has in the
more typical gift situation, and the added weight thereby accorded to
that principle seems to us sufficient to warrant taxing the donations.
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We believe that the Duberstein rule should be revisited by the Supreme Court and modified to recognize that there are circumstances
where it is proper for the action of the transferee to control the characterization of the transaction. It will be difficult to bring that issue to
the Supreme Court unless one or more Courts of Appeals take that
position so that the taxpayer will seek certiorari. It is unfortunate that
the Ninth Circuit passed up that opportunity in the Olk case.
III.

ADJUSTMENTS TO A DONEE'S TRANSFERRED BASIS AND DONOR'S
GAIN RECOGNITION

A donor may incur expenses (such as title transfer costs) in connection with transferring property to a donee. One question is
whether the amount paid by the donor for that purpose should be
added to the basis that the donee acquires in the donated property. A
second question is whether the donee's payment of those expenses
will affect the donee's basis. Also, as previously noted, 157 in certain
circumstances, typically only in the case of gifts of large value, the
transfer may incur a gift tax. If the gift tax is paid by the donor,
should that have an effect on the donee's basis? If the gift tax is paid
by the donee, should that have an effect on the donee's basis and to
what extent, if any, should it cause the donor to recognize income?
We will address those questions in Part III of this Article.
A.

Transfer Expenses Other Than Gift Taxes

The expenses incurred in transferring property to a donee, excluding gift tax impositions for the moment, do not represent an additional investment in the donated property. They are merely personal
costs of shifting ownership from one party to another. As discussed
above, we have concluded that one of the principles of the income tax
system is to permit an individual who has paid an income tax to
choose to have another person consume the taxed property without
triggering a second income tax. That principle led to the exclusion of
gifts from the donee's income to prevent a doubling of the income tax
on a single consumption. But the same principle does not require
that the personal expenses of transferring the property be treated as
an investment. If the owner of an item of property held for personal
use incurs a cost in moving the item to another location for personal
reasons, that cost is not an investment in the property and does not
increase the owner's basis. Similarly, the cost of moving the ownership of an item from a donor to a donee, who together comprise a
157

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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single tax unit, does not constitute an investment. The expenses paid
by the donor will not, and should not, affect the donee's basis.
If the donee pays the transfer costs, that is an expense of acquiring the property. But, as discussed in greater detail below, 158 in the
case of a gift in which the donee makes a payment to the donor equal
to part of the value of the transferred property, the donee's payment
of partial consideration for the property affects the donee's basis only
to the extent that the amount paid exceeds the donor's basis. 1 59 If the
donor were primarily liable for the expenses that the donee paid, current tax law will treat the payments as consideration paid to the donor
for receiving the property, which will affect the donee's basis only to
the extent that the total of such consideration exceeds the donor's
basis. 160 If the donor were not primarily liable for the expenses paid
by the donee, regardless of whether the amount of the donee's payment exceeds the donor's basis, the payments should not affect the
donee's basis because they do not represent an additional investment
in the property and do not cause the donor to recognize income.
B.

Gift Taxes Paid by the Donor

The donor is the party who is primarily liable for the payment of
federal gift taxes. 6 1 The donor's payment of gift taxes could be
treated the same as the payment of other costs of donating property,
and thus have no effect on the donee's basis. Prior to 1958, the income tax law did not provide for any adjustment to the donee's basis
because of federal gift tax payments, but the Code was amended in
that year to provide an upward adjustment. 62 The justification for
allowing an adjustment to the donee's basis is that the federal gift tax
constitutes a double federal tax on the donated property-i.e., (1) the
federal income tax previously paid by the donor (or by a previous donor of a chain of gifts) plus, if the property is appreciated, the federal
income tax that will be payable by the donee when the donee sells the
property, and (2) the federal gift tax on the transfer. As previously
noted, Congress accepted this double tax consequence because the
goals of the gift tax are deemed more important than the goal of allowing a taxpayer to enjoy someone else's consumption.163 But the
158
159
160

See infra Part III.C.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a) (as amended in 1972); see also infra Part III.C.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a).

161

I.R.C. § 2502(c) (2000).

162 See id. § 1015(d); see also supra text accompanying note 50. Some states impose
a gift tax, but there is no provision for increasing a donee's basis for state gift taxes.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
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double tax imposition made Congress uneasy, and so it enacted some
relief in its 1958 amendment, providing for an addition to the basis of
the donee. By increasing the donee's basis in the donated property,
Congress mitigated the double tax by permitting the federal gift tax
cost to reduce any gain the donee might have on a subsequent disposition of the property. It is by no means obvious that mitigation is desirable, but Congress has chosen to provide it. If the goals underlying
gift taxation are deemed sufficiently important to justify double taxation, there seems to be no compelling reason to reduce the effective
rate of the gift tax by mitigating it only in some circumstances. Even
before the adoption in 1976 of a further limitation on the amount of
increase to a donee's basis, there has been an arbitrary element to the
operation of the provision in that the donee's basis is not permitted to
64
exceed the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift. 1
The purpose of that limitation is to prevent the creation of a built-in
loss deduction for the donee, but it means that there will be less, or no
relief, from double taxation for donors who transfer property with a
high basis in relation to its value. That discrimination was exacerbated in 1976 when Congress again amended the statute.
In 1976, Congress amended the Code to further limit the amount
of gift tax that can be added to a donee's basis. 65 Section 1015(d) (6)
of the Code limits the amount added to basis to the federal gift tax
that is attributable to the appreciated portion of the donated property
(i.e., the appreciated portion is the amount by which the value of the
property exceeds the donor's basis). 166 In the General Explanation of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation), 167 hereinafter referred to as the "Blue Book," the
Joint Committee's staff stated that the congressional purpose in 1958
for providing an addition to the donee's basis was to insulate from
income taxation a part of the appreciated portion of the donated
property equal to the gift tax paid on the entire amount of appreciation.1 68 In describing the reason that Congress decided in 1976 to
amend the statute, the staff stated in the Blue Book,
164

I.R.C. § 1015(d)(1)(A).

165

Id. § 1015(d) (6).

166

The method for determining the amount of gift tax that is attributable to the

appreciated portion of the donated property is set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-5(c)
(as amended in 1995).
167

Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation

of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, at 561 (Comm. Print 1976), repinted in 1976-3 C.B.
(vol. 2) 573.
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Congress believed that prior law was too generous in that it permitted the basis of the gift property to be increased by the full amount
of the gift tax paid on the gift and not just the gift tax attributable to
the appreciation at the time of the gift. Consequently, the Act provides that the increase in basis of property acquired by gift is limited
9
to the gift tax attributable to the net appreciation on the gift.'16
Very little, if anything, can be said in favor of the 1976 amendment. The Blue Book states that Congress wished to mitigate the
double taxation of the appreciated portion of the donated property,
which will be subjected both to a gift tax and to an income tax when
the property is sold. But the portion of the property equal to the donor's basis (i.e., the unappreciated portion of the property) typically
will have already been taxed either to the donor or to a prior donor of
a chain of gifts. If Congress shied away from a full-fledged double tax
on the appreciated portion, why does it embrace a double tax on the
unappreciated portion? It is true that if part of a donor's basis is attributable to a stepped-up basis obtained under Code § 1014 from an
inheritance, that part of the donor's basis has not been subjected to
an income tax, and so no relief from double taxation is warranted for
the gift tax on that portion of the basis. But the administrative costs of
ascertaining the amount of basis that can be traced to a Code § 1014
step-up is daunting. In our view, the aggregate amount of donors'
bases that is attributable to a Code § 1014 step-up will not be great
enough to justify either the administrative cost of identifying it or the
adoption of a draconic rule denying an adjustment to the gift tax on
the entirety of a donor's basis.
In our view, while the mitigation of a double tax (i.e., the imposition of both an income tax and a gift tax) is a defensible concept, it is
not required by tax principles. However, having chosen that path,
there is no principled reason to limit the mitigation to the double tax
on the appreciated portion of the property.
C.

Gift Taxes Paid by the Donee

As noted above, the donor is the party who has the primary liability for payment of the federal gift tax. 170 However, if the donor fails to
pay the entire amount of the tax, the donee is secondarily liable as a
transferee. 17 1 While the donor usually is the one actually to pay the
gift tax, there are circumstances in which the donee pays all or part of
169 Id.
170 I.R.C. § 2502(c).
171 Id. § 6901(a). The Government also has a lien on the donated property. Id.
§ 6324(b).
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the tax. The donor may condition the gift on the donee's paying the
gift tax, or the donor may fail to pay all of the tax so that the Government collects it from the donee or by enforcing its lien on the
donated property.
If a gift is conditioned on the donee's payment of gift taxes, the
donee's payment is treated as compensation to the donor, which
reduces the value of the gift that is made and so reduces the amount
of gift tax that is owed. 1 72 Because the amount of the gift tax depends
upon the amount donated, the two figures are interdependent, which
causes a calculation problem that, however, is resolved by use of an
algebraic formula. 173 A donative transfer which is conditioned upon
the donee's payment of the gift tax is sometimes referred to as a "net
74
gift."1
Some states also impose a gift tax. 175 The party who has the primary liability for the payment of such taxes is set by state law; it may be
placed on either the donor or the donee or on both jointly. 76 If a gift
is made on condition that the donee pay a state gift tax liability for
which the donor was primarily liable, the donee's payment of that gift
tax is treated as compensation to the donor and reduces the value of
the gift that was made.' 77 In other words, a donee's payment of a state
gift tax pursuant to a condition of the gift is treated the same, in this
respect, as is a donee's payment of the federal gift tax, but only to the
extent that the donor is primarily liable for payment of the state
tax. 178 If the gift is conditioned on the donee's payment of both federal and state gift taxes, the computation of the amount given must
t 79
take into account a reduction for both gift taxes.
172

See Rev. Rul. 81-223, 1981-2 C.B. 189; Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310.

173 E.g., Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310.
174 See Diedrich v. Comm'r, 457 U.S. 191, 199 (1982).
175 For example, North Carolina and Wisconsin impose gift taxes. See Rev. Rul.
76-57, 1976-1 C.B. 297; Rev. Rul. 80-111, 1980-1 C.B. 208.
176 Compare Rev. Rul. 76-57, 1976-1 C.B. 297 (discussing taxation when North Carolina placed the primary liability on the donor), with Rev. Rul. 80-111, 1980-1 C.B. 208
(discussing taxation when Wisconsin placed the primary liability jointly on the donor
and donee).
177 E.g., Rev. Rul. 76-57, 1976-1 C.B. 297.
178 In Revenue Ruling 80-111, 1980-1 C.B. 208, a gift was made conditional on the
donee's payment of the Wisconsin gift tax. Wisconsin law made the donor and donee
jointly liable for payment of the state gift tax. Because only one-half of the Wisconsin
gift tax was the primary obligation of the donor, only one-half of the gift tax paid by
the donee constituted consideration to the donor and reduced the amount of the
gift. Id.
179 Rev. Rul. 76-49, 1976-1 C.B. 294.
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A net gift transaction is one in which the gift is either explicitly or
implicitly conditioned on the donee's payment of the gift tax.' 8 0 The
rulings dealing with the effect of a donee's payment of the gift tax
have all involved net gift situations and have expressly limited their
holdings to situations where the gift was conditioned on the donee's
payment of the tax." 8" What if a gift is not so conditioned, but the
donee is required to pay the tax because the donor fails to do so?
While the rulings do not address that situation, there is no reason for
the donee's payment of the tax in such cases to be treated any differently. The donee's payment of the gift tax is as much compensation
to the donor in such cases as it is where the payment is made pursuant
to a condition of the gift. While, in such cases, the donor may have
intended to make a larger gift, the donee's payment relieves the donor of an obligation, is compensation to the donor, and reduces the
amount of the gift. It would be unrealistic to treat the donor's transfer and the donee's payments as independent gifts to each other
rather than netting them out as a single transaction. The donee's payment is not voluntary; it is a conditiQn imposed by law on the recipient
of the gift; and so is integrally related to the donor's gift. Later in this
Part, we will consider whether the current law's treatment of net gifts
is warranted,1 8 2 but given that treatment, a payment of gift taxes by
the donee because of the donee's secondary liability should be treated
the same.
If the gift was not conditioned on the donee's payment of the gift
tax, will the donee have a right of reimbursement from the donor for
having paid the tax or having the Government collect the tax through
invoking its lien on the donated property? In our view, the donee will
not have a right of reimbursement. A person who had expectations of
receiving a gift which was not forthcoming can obtain restitution from
a wrongdoer (or from a person who benefited from the wrongdoer's
act) who unlawfully prevented the gift from being made. The right of
reimbursement applies only against third parties, and does not apply
against the donor or the donor's estate. Even as to a third party, there
is no liability unless the same or another third party committed a
wrongful act that prevented the gift from being made; the wrongful
act must have been fraud, undue influence, duress, the use of physical
force, or a similar unlawful act.' 83 Moreover, even if such a wrongful
180 See Diedrich v. Comm'r, 457 U.S. 191, 199 (1982).
181 See Rev. Rul. 81-223, 1981-2 C.B. 189; Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310; see also
Diedrich, 457 U.S. at 192.
182 See infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
183 See4 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 19.5 (1978 & Supp. 2002).
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act occurs, the donor's subsequent declaration that the donor no
longer wishes to make a gift to the donee will defeat an action for
restitution.18 4 Clearly, there can be no action for restitution against
the donor. In addition, in the case of a gift, the donor and the donee
both benefit from the payment of the gift tax, and the Government's
order of priority for collection does not mean that the donor was
unjustly enriched by the donee's payment of the tax.
If, contrary to our view, the donee were held to have a right of
reimbursement from the donor, the presence of that right would
seem to prevent a reduction of the amount of the donor's gift for the
gift tax liability and would prevent income recognition by the donor.
But, what happens if the right of the donee is never enforced, as likely
would be the case? When the statute of limitations for enforcing that
right of reimbursement expires, there would be a cancellation of the
donor's debt to the donee. For gift tax purposes, that cancellation
should be treated as a reduction of the amount of gift that the donor
made to the donee in the earlier year. The cancellation should be
linked to the original gift and treated as a single transaction. Similarly, the transactional approach should be applied for income tax
purposes as well, and so the donor should not recognize any income
because of the cancellation. The cancellation should be treated as a
reduction of the donor's gift for income tax purposes as well.' 1 5 In
any event, as noted above, 186 there likely is no right of reimbursement
for the donee.
The Service's rulings on the treatment of a donee's payment of
gift taxes related only to the gift tax consequence of those payments.
The rulings cited above did not address the income tax consequences.
Let us now consider the income tax consequences.
Because the donor is primarily liable for payment of the federal
gift tax, the Supreme Court held in Diedrich v. Commissioner that the
donee's payment constitutes an amount realized by the donor on the
disposition of the property.18 7 That conclusion accords with the gift
tax treatment of such payments. We discuss the merits of that decision below, but since it does represent the current state of the tax law,
184
185

Id.
See

186
187

See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
Diedrich v. Comm'r, 457 U.S. 191 (1982). A donee's payment of a state gift tax

KAHN,

supra note 10, at 70.

for which the donor was primarily liable will have the same income tax consequence
as does the payment of the federal gift tax. Id. In Diedrich, the donee paid both
federal and state gift taxes that were imposed on the transfer, and the Court treated
the entire sum of gift tax payments as an amount realized by the donor. Id. at

192-93.
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we will first consider the consequences of that treatment. The entire
amount of federal gift tax paid by the donee is treated as an amount
realized by the donor. 8 Because that amount (consisting of the gift
tax on the value of the property) necessarily will be less than the value
of the property, the transaction will be recast as a part-gift, part-sale
transaction, which is one type of a bargain sale. If the amount realized by the donor (i.e., the gift tax paid by the donee) is greater than
the donor's basis, the donor will recognize a gain to the extent of the
difference. The entire amount of the donor's basis is offset against
the amount realized in determining the donor's gain; the basis is not
allocated between the part of the property that is sold and the part
that is donated.1 9 If the amount realized by the donor is less than the
donor's basis, the donor nevertheless will not realize a loss even if the
value of the property also is less than the donor's basis. 1 °
The first step in determining the donee's basis in the donated
property is to give the donee a basis equal to the greater of the donor's basis or the amount paid by the donee. 19 1 That figure is then
increased by the amount of gift tax paid, even though paid by the
donee, subject to the statutory limitations on the amount of increase
in a donee's basis for gift tax payments. 92 Those limitations are that
188 See id. at 198-99; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e) (as amended in 1996).
189 See Diedrich, 457 U.S. at 198-99; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e). Initially, in a 1933
ruling, the Service maintained that, in the case of a bargain sale made for gift purposes, the transaction must be bifurcated into two separate transactions: a fraction of
the property is treated as having been sold to the donee-purchaser for the amount
realized by the donor-vendor, and the remaining fraction of the property is treated as
a gift to the donee-purchaser. I.T. 2681, 12-1 C.B. 93 (1933). Under the 1933 ruling,
the donor-vendor's basis in property that is the subject of a part-gift, part-sale treatment, must be apportioned between the portion of the property that is deemed to
have been sold and the portion that was donated. Id. The donor-vendor's gain would
then be measured by comparing the amount realized with the portion of the donorvendor's basis that was allocated to the portion of the asset that was sold. The initial
position of the Service is the better approach, but it is not the treatment that is cutrrently accorded. In a 1939 Board of Tax Appeals (the prior name for the Tax Court)
decision concerning a part-gift, part-sale transaction, the court held that the donorvendor's entire basis in the asset is applied against the amount realized to determine
the donor-vendor's gain, if any. Fincke v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 510 (1939), nonacq.,
1939-1 C.B. 47, withdrawn and acq., 1939-2 C.B. 12. The Service initially nonacquiesed
in the Fincke decision; but, shortly afterwards, withdrew its nonacquiescence and substituted an acquiescence. Ever since, the Service has used the donor-vendor's entire
basis in determining gain. This treatment is reflected in the Treasury Regulations,
e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e) (1996), and has impliedly been accepted by Congress.
See I.R.C. §§ 1011(b), 170(e) (2) (2000).
190 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e).
191 Id. § 1.1015-4(a)(1) (1972).
192 Id. § 1.1015-4(a) (2).
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the basis cannot be increased to a figure that is greater than the property's fair market value and that only the gift tax on the appreciated
193
portion of the property can be added to the donee's basis.
The rule that provides the donee with a basis, before adjustments,
equal to the greater of the donor's basis or the amount realized by the
donor is appropriate. 194 The single unit concept treats the donor and
195
the donee as one tax unit with a single investment in the property.
If the amount realized by the donor is not greater than his basis, the
donor does not recognize any gain, and there has not been any additional investment in the property by the tax unit. All that has occurred is that some of the investment that the donor made has been
returned to him and shifted to the donee, but the unit's investment
has not changed. On the other hand, if the amount realized by the
donor (i.e., the amount of gift tax paid by the donee) is greater than
the donor's basis, then the donor will recognize income in the
amount of the difference. The income is attributable to the donated
property and will be characterized as gain from a sale of that property. 196 A portion of the appreciation of the property in the donor's
hands has thereby been recognized. If the amount of that income
recognition were not added to the property's basis, the gain that the
donor recognized would be taxed a second time when the donee sells
the property. It is necessary to increase the donee's basis by the
19 7
amount of the donor's gain to prevent that doubling of the tax.
Providing the donee with a basis equal to the amount paid by the
donee when that amount is greater than the donor's basis means that
the donee's basis will equal the donor's basis plus the gain recognized
by the donor.
It also is proper to apply the gift tax increase in basis when the
donee pays the tax. Because current tax law treats the donee's payment as an amount realized by the donor, the transaction effectively is
treated as if the donee paid consideration directly to the donor, and
the donor paid the gift tax. The addition to donee's basis, therefore,
should be the same as it would be if the donor had actually paid the
gift tax. Even if the donee's payment of the gift tax were not treated
as consideration to the donor, it is still appropriate to increase the
donee's basis since that increase serves to mitigate the double taxation
193
194
195
196
197

I.R.C. §§ 1015(d)(1), (6).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a) (1).
See id.
Id. § 1.1001-1(e)(1) (1996).
See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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(of income and gift taxation) that the single tax unit of the donor and
donee incurs.
Of course, only the gift tax attributable to the appreciated portion of the property is added to the donee's basis. But, in determining the portion of the property that gave rise to a gift tax, recall that
the donor's basis is offset first against the amount realized by the donor. So, only the gift tax attributable to the amount of basis that is in
excess of the amount realized will be disallowed as an addition to the
donee's basis. If the amount realized equals or exceeds the donor's
basis, then the entire amount of the gift tax paid by the donee will be
attributable to the appreciated portion of the property, and that limitation will not be applicable.
While there is no authoritative declaration as to the correct
method for determining a donee's basis in a net gift situation, the
conclusions stated above are a reasonable application of the relevant
tax rules. We believe that the rules are likely to be applied in that
manner.
Finally, let us turn to a consideration of whether the Supreme
Court reached the correct result in Diedrich.198 There is no dispute
that the decision reached in Diedrichis the law today, 199 but it is worthwhile to examine the merits of that rule.
Diedrich involved two consolidated cases in each of which a gift
was made, the donee paid the federal gift tax, and the amount of that
gift tax exceeded the donor's basis in the donated property. The Tax
Court held that the donor did not recognize income from that transaction, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. To
resolve a conflict in the circuits on that issue, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. The Supreme Court held that, because the donor
was primarily liable for the federal gift tax, the donee's payment of
that tax satisfied a debt of the donor to the Government, and so was
an amount realized by the donor on the disposition of the transferred
property. The Court deemed it irrelevant that the donor's "debt" to
the Government arose concurrently with the making of the gift and so
was not a preexisting debt. The donor recognized gain to the extent
that the gift tax payment by the donee exceeded the donor's basis.
198

Diedrich v. Comm'r, 457 U.S. 191 (1982).

199

Following Diedrich, Congress enacted § 1026 of the Deficit Reduction Act of

1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, so that the Supreme Court's decision would not
be applied retroactively. Davis v. Comm'r, 746 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1984). Although
"[C]ongress believed that taxpayers should not be adversely affected because they
made gifts in reliance on what they believed was established law," the House Ways and
Means Committee believed the decision in Diedrichwas correct. Cleaverv. Wis. Dep't of
Revenue, 447 N.W.2d 102, 104 & n.7 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
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The key to the Court's decision was that the federal tax law makes the
donor primarily liable for the gift tax (the donee is secondarily liable).
The Court stated, "When a donor makes a gift to a donee, a 'debt' to
the United States for the amount of the gift tax is incurred by the
donor."20 0 The holding of that case has been widely applauded by tax
commentators, 20 1 but there is reason to question it.
In our view, much too much was made by the Court of the fact
that the tax law places the primary obligation for the payment of the
gift tax on the donor. The gift tax is a cost exacted by the Government for the transfer of donated property. The payment of that tax is
as much for the benefit of the donee, who acquires the donated property thereby, as it is for the donor, who thereby places the property in
the hands of the person he wishes to have it. In effect, the gift tax is a
common obligation of both parties because its satisfaction is a necessary hurdle for the fulfillment of the transfer that both parties desire.
The statutory placement of the primary liability on the donor has
little practical significance as to who will pay the tax since the donor
can refuse to make the gift unless the donee agrees to the donor's
proposal. The only meaningful significance of making the donor primarily liable is that, if the donor pays the tax, that payment will not
constitute an additional gift to the donee. The fact that the gift tax
paid by the donor is not included in the gifts made to the donee
makes the gift tax scheme one that is "tax exclusive." 20 2 This is in
contrast to the estate tax scheme in which the estate taxes paid to the
Government are nevertheless included in the decedent's gross estate
so that an estate tax is paid on the amount of estate tax itself. 20 3 The

tax exclusive attribute of the gift tax is a major incentive for making
lifetime gifts and thereby avoiding the tax inclusive treatment of the
estate tax on the property that is donated. Congress's placing of the
primary liability on the donor can be viewed as nothing more than the
device that was chosen to implement the decision to make the gift tax
a tax exclusive scheme in order to promote lifetime gifts. It hardly
200 Diedrich, 457 U.S. at 197.
201 See KLEIN ET. AL., supra note 47, at 198-99; Stuart Duhl & Jeffrey L. Kwall,
Supreme Court Holds That Net Gift Tiggers Income to Donor: An Analysis of Diedrich, 57J.
TAX'N 130 (1982); Ren~e T. Hennessy, Diedrich-The Economic Reality of Net Gifts, 13
TAX ADVISER 580 (1982); Dean J. Formanek, Comment, Diedrich v. Commissioner:
Closing the "Net Gift" Income Tax Loophole, 68 IowA L. REv. 379 (1983). But see Eric J.
Thoman, Note, Recent Developments, The Use of Net Gifts After Diedrich v. Commissioner Is Down but Not Out, 61 OR. L. REv. 459 (1982) (criticizing the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Diedrich).
202 See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Death Without Taxes, 20 VA. TAX.
REV. 499, 518 (2001).

203

See id.
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seems appropriate to make significant income tax consequences turn
on the happenstance that Congress chose one method to implement a
tax exclusive scheme instead of some other method that would not
have involved the placement of tax liability.
Moreover, in other areas of the income tax law, a liability that
arises out of a matter of common concern to two parties has been
treated as an obligation of both for purposes of the income tax law.
Consider a circumstance that arises in connection with corporate reorganizations. In certain types of corporate reorganizations, no payment to the shareholders of a target corporation can be made in any
form other than voting stock. 20 4 A payment to a target's shareholder
in some form other than the acquiring corporation's voting stock is
commonly referred to as "boot."205 The use of any boot in such a
transaction would prevent it from qualifying as a reorganization,
thereby forfeiting all the favorable consequences that flow from that
qualification. However, if the shareholders of the target corporation
incur expenses that are directly related to the reorganization, such as
legal and accounting fees, appraisal expenses, and registration fees,
the acquiring corporation's payment or assumption of those liabilities
does not constitute boot to the shareholders-i.e., it does not constitute consideration paid to the shareholders even though it is their
6 The acquiring corporation's paylegal liability that was satisfied. 211
ment of such liabilities of the shareholders does not affect the qualification of the transaction for reorganization treatment. 20 7 Similarly,
the income tax consequence of a donee's payment of a gift tax should
not turn on the law's choice of where to place the primary liability for
payment of the gift tax.
As to the question of whether, as a matter of tax policy, the donee's payment of a gift tax should reduce the amount of the donor's
gift for gift tax purposes, our view is that it should not, regardless of
whether the donee's payment was required by the terms of the gift. In
other words, we believe that the revenue rulings to the contrary are
bad tax policy although they are supported by the Supreme Court's
decision in Diedrich.
204 The so-called "B" reorganization is an example of this rule. I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1)(B) (2000). The same rule applies to the "C" reorganization, although
there is some relaxation of the requirement in that case. Id. § 368(a)(1)(C).
205

KAREN C. BURKE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARELEHMAN, CORPORATE IN-

H-OLDERS 241 (4th ed. 1996); DouCLAs A. KAHN &JEFFREY S.
COME TAXATION 616, 880 (5th ed. 2001).
206 See Rev. Rul. 73-54, 1973-1 C.B. 187 (citing cases).
207 Id.
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Because we do not regard the donee's payment of the gift tax as
compensation for the transfer, it should not reduce the amount of the
donor's gift. The property transferred to the donee will no longer be
part of the donor's estate when he dies; and so, unless part of the
donor's transfer can be treated as a constructive reimbursement of the
donee for the payment of the gift tax, and therefore effectively a payment of the gift tax by the donor (which constructive payment by the
donor would qualify for tax exclusive treatment), the entire amount
transferred should constitute a gift. In our view, the donor's transfer
is not a constructive payment of the gift tax because it is paid by the
donee for the donee's own benefit. Nevertheless, given the Diedrich
decision, even though that is an income tax case, the current law is
that the gift tax payment by the donee in a net gift transaction will
reduce the amount of the donor's gift, and it seems likely that the
same rule will apply when the gift tax is paid by the donee because of
the donor's failure to pay the tax.
It is interesting to note what the tax consequences would be if,
contrary to Diedrich, the donee's payment of the gift tax were not
treated as consideration to the donor, and if contrary to our view, part
of the donor's transfer were deemed to be a constructive payment of
the gift tax. If that were the case, the amount of the gift would reflect
a reduction for the gift tax payment. But if the property transferred
was either appreciated or depreciated, the portion deemed to have
been constructively used to pay the gift tax would cause the recognition of a gain or loss on that portion of the property. The constructive
payment by the donor would constitute an exchange of the property.
Note that, in such a case, unlike the current treatment of net gifts, the
donor would be permitted to use only a portion of his basis in the
property in measuring gain recognized, if any. If the donor recognized a loss on the constructive payment, it could be deducted regardless of the donor's relationship to the donee because the exchange
would be made with the Government and not with the donee. In any
event, none of that is relevant under current law, because the donee's
payment will be treated as compensation to the donor.
IV.

GIFTS

TO A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION

A.

Introduction

Section 170(a) of the Code provides a deduction for a "charitable
contribution." The Code defines a charitable contribution as a "contribution or gift" to an organization that qualifies as a charitable recip-

496
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ient.2 018 Although the terms "contribution" and "gift" are not defined

in § 170 of the Code or in the regulations thereunder, the courts have
held that the two terms are synonymous. 20 9 For convenience, we will

discuss solely the question of the meaning of the term "gift" for Code
§ 170 charitable contribution purposes because the same definition
will apply also to the term "contribution."
Unlike the exclusion of gifts from a donee's income, no deduction was allowed for gifts to charitable institutions when the first postSixteenth Amendment income tax revenue act was adopted in
1913.210 A provision allowing a deduction for charitable contributions
by individuals was first included in the War Revenue Act of 1917.211
The 1917 Act provided a deduction for
[c]ontributions or gifts actually made within the year to corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, or to societies
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the
net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder
or individual, to an amount not in excess of fifteen per centum of
the taxpayer's taxable net income as computed without the benefit
of this paragraph. Such contributions or gifts shall be allowable as
deductions only if verified under rules and regulations prescribed
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the
2 12
Secretary of the Treasury.
Corporations were not permitted a deduction for charitable contributions until 1935.213 A deduction for charitable contributions and
gifts by both individuals and corporations has remained in the Code,
in one form or another, to the present day.
Unlike the Code § 102 definition of a gift, which became settled
when the Supreme Court decided the Duberstein 1 4 case, many of the
cases and rulings involving the definition of a gift for Code § 170 purposes are contradictory, and so the meaning of the term in the charitable gift area is not as neatly settled as in § 102. While there are
numerous decisions on this issue, we will discuss four major tax cases
208 I.R.C. § 170(c).
209 E.g., Dejong v. Comm'r, 309 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1962). Also, in Hernandez
v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1988), the Supreme Court noted with approval that
courts have treated the two terms as synonymous.
210 SeeJ.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS
1938-1861, at 945 (1938).
211 War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
212

Id.

213
214

Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016.
Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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that illustrate the different constructions that have been given to the
term.
B.

2 15
Dejong v. Commissioner

The Dejongs were a married couple who claimed a charitable
contribution deduction for an amount paid to the Society For Christian Instruction. 2 16 The Society For Christian Instruction was a nonprofit corporation that owned and operated a grammar and high
school in the area where the Dejongs lived, and the Dejongs were
members of the church associated with the school.2 1 7

The school

charged no tuition for its students but raised a majority of its funds by
soliciting from parents of enrolled students. 2 18 During the year at issue, the Dejongs had two children enrolled in the school operated by
the Society.2 19 The sole issue for the Tax Court was whether the
Dejongs could deduct $400, which was stipulated as the approximate
22 0
cost for the Society of educating the Dejongs' two children.
The Tax Court held that the disallowed $400 that the Dejongs
"contributed" to the Society was in the nature of tuition paid for their
children's education at the Society's school, 22 ' and the Ninth Circuit
agreed.2 22 The Ninth Circuit held that the standard set out in Duberstein in defining a gift for Code § 102 purposes applies equally to that
term as used in Code § 170.223 Thus, a charitable donor must have
"detached and disinterested generosity" in order to qualify for the
charitable gift deduction. 224 The Ninth Circuit held that because the
$400 was given in exchange for taxpayers' children's education, it
could not be a charitable gift as it was not given with the requisite state
of mind.

225

The Ninth Circuit in DeJongdetermined that the definition of gift
for Code § 102 purposes should also be used for charitable contribu215 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
216 Id. at 374.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 374-75.
219 Id. at 375.
220 Id. The Dejongs contributed $1075 to the Society, but the only issue before

the Ninth Circuit was the $400 amount. The Service allowed the remaining portion
of the Dejongs' contribution ($675) as a charitable deduction, and so there was no
issue as to that amount. Dejong v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 896, 897 (1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d
373 (9th Cir. 1962).
221 DeJong, 36 T.C. at 899.
222 DeJong v. Comm'r, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
223 Id. at 377 (citing Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960)).
224 Id. at 378 (citing Comm'r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)).

225

Id. at 379.
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tion purposes. In addition to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dejong, a
number of court decisions have applied the Duberstein definition of
gift to the charitable contribution area.2 2 6 But other courts have re-

jected the application of the Duberstein definition. 22 7 Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit itself subsequently held that the Duberstein standard
228
does not apply to charitable gifts made by a corporate donor.
C.

2 29
Singer Company v. United States

In another significant case, the Court of Claims 230 specifically declined to utilize the Duberstein standard for the definition of gifts for
purposes of the charitable gift deduction. 231 The Singer Company
was a manufacturer of sewing machines. 232 During the year 1954,
Singer sold a large number of machines to charitable organizations at
break-even prices, which were far less than the retail value of the machines. 23 3 Some of the machines were sold to public and parochial
schools, and some were sold to other charities, including churches,
the Red Cross, hospitals, and government agencies. 234 Singer claimed
a charitable deduction for the amount of the discounts that were
given to the charitable organizations, and the Service denied those
235
deductions.
226 E.g., Winters v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Sklar v. Comm'r, 2000
2000-118 (2000), affd on a different standard, 282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir.
T.C.M. (RIA)
2002); Fausner v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 620 (1971); Wolfe v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1707
(1970).
227 See Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Comm'r, 380 F.2d 146, 147 (1st Cir. 1967);
Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 421-22 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
228 United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968), affg 254 F.
Supp. 504 (N.D. Cal. 1966). While affirming the district court's decision denying the
charitable deduction, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected application of the Duberstein standard in deciding the deductibility of a corporate donor's contribution to a
charity. Id. at 523-24.
229 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
230 The Court of Claims was subsequently absorbed into the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. See Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96
Stat. 25 (1982).
231 Singer, 449 F.2d at 422.
232 Id. at 414.
233 Id. at 415-16.
234 Id.
235 Because Singer sold the machines for an amount that covered its basis and
costs, the "contribution" to the charitable organizations was of a portion of the machines for which Singer had no basis. Had Singer sold those machines for their value,
the amount received by Singer for the appreciated portion of a machine would have
been treated as ordinary income to Singer. Under current law, a contribution to a
charity is reduced for the portion of the value of the contribution that would have
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The Service argued that the Duberstein definition should be applied. 23 6 The court chose to apply a different standard 23 7 and indicated its skepticism of the Service's position:
[i]f we were to accept the definition of gift as it is proffered by [the
Service], it would then be necessary for us to look to the subjective
intent of the plaintiff when awarding discounts to organizations described by section 170(c). This would not be an impossible task, but
it would indeed be a very difficult one. It would necessitate a determination of whether plaintiff gave the discounts because they were
primarily motivated by business considerations or, conversely, because of "detached and disinterested generosity" and out of "affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses. '238
Singer contested the subjective approach proposed by the Service
and instead urged that a deduction for a gift should be denied only
when "there is a specific and direct quid pro quo flowing from the transfer."23 9 Singer's approach would take into account only direct bene240
fits the transferor received and would ignore any indirect benefits.
The court rejected that distinction and instead made the test turn on
the substantiality of the cumulative benefits the transferor obtained
from the transaction. 2 4 1 While rejecting Singer's approach as "overly
restrictive and quite narrow,"2 42 the standard that the court chose is
produced ordinary income if the property had been sold at its fair market value.
I.R.C. § 170(e) (1) (A) (2000). If that provision had been in effect when Singer made
the "contributions" in question, all or part of the contributions would have been disallowed as a deduction by that provision, except to the extent that some deduction may
have been allowed by § 170(e) (3), which was added to the Code in 1976. Id.
§ 170(e)(3). But, the denial of a deduction for gifts of ordinary income property was
added to the Code in 1962, and so did not apply to the contributions in the Singer
case because they took place in 1954. Id. § 170(e). It is for that reason that there is
no discussion of that issue in the case.
236 Singer, 449 F.2d at 418.
237 While the plaintiff in Singer is a corporation, and there are special considerations that militate against using the Duberstein definition for corporate charitable donors, see United States v. Transamerica Corp. 392 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1968), affg
254 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Cal. 1966), the court in Singer did not restrict its position to
corporate donors.
238 Singer, 449 F.2d at 418-19 (quoting Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285
(1960)).
239 Id. at 419.
240 An example of an indirect financial benefit is a donation of land to a city for
dedication as a public park that increases the market value of adjoining land that the
taxpayer retains. Another example is Singer's donation of sewing machines to
schools, which gave Singer the indirect benefit of creating a pool of potential
customers.
241 Id. at 422-23.
242 Id. at 420.
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closer to the one Singer sought than the one that the Service
proposed.
The court found support for its holding in language of the committee reports to the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
(which subsequently became the current Internal Revenue Code of
1986).243 While there is very little legislative history to the original
charitable deduction provision in 1917, a related provision, which was
adopted in 1935, was included in the 1954 Code as § 162(b), and has
remained in the Code relatively unchanged.2 44 Section 162(b) of the
Code disallows a business deductionfor an item that would have qualified as a charitable contribution or gift if it were not for the limitations in Code § 170 on the amount that can be deducted. 245 When
that provision was included in the 1954 Code, the committee reports
discussed it and stated what the committees believed a charitable gift
to be. 24 6 The committee reports on the inclusion of § 162(b) in the
1954 Code state that charitable gifts are "those contributions which
are made with no expectation of a financial return commensurate
with the amount of the

gift." 2 4 7

It is noteworthy that in a subsequent

case, the Supreme Court also quoted that language from the committee reports in passing on the meaning of the term gift in Code

§

170.248

After discussing the legislative history to Code § 162(b), the court
set out its definition for determining whether a payment will qualify as
a gift:
It is our opinion that if the benefits received. [sic] or expected to be
received, are substantial, and meaning by that, benefits greater than
those that inure to the general public from transfers for charitable
purposes (which benefits are merely incidentalto the transfer), then

in such case we feel the transferor has received, or expects to receive, a quid pro quo sufficient to remove the transfer from the realm
of deductibility under section 170. With this standard, we feel that
the subjective approach of "disinterested generosity" need not be
wrestled with and we are of the opinion that our approach coincides
249
perfectly with our reading of section 162(b).

243

Id.

244 Id. at 419-20.
245 Section 170(b) of the Code imposes a ceiling on the amount of charitable
contributions that can be deducted, and that ceiling is framed as a percentage of
income. I.R.C § 170(b) (2000).
246 Singer, 449 F.2d at 420.

247

Id. (emphasis omitted).

248
249

See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
Singer, 449 F.2d at 423.
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The court then reached a divided result as to the deductions that
Singer sought. As to the bargain sales of machines to schools, the
court concluded that Singer received quid pro quo for those sales by
facilitating the education of students to the use of sewing machines so
that they would become customers and purchase sewing machines
when they left school. 250 The court therefore denied Singer a deduction for the discount on the sales to schools.

25 1

However, as to the

bargain sales of machines to other organizations, the court held that
any benefits that Singer received were merely incidental. 25 2 The court
therefore allowed Singer a deduction for the discount given to organi25 3
zations other than the schools.
254
D. United States v. American Bar Endowment

The Supreme Court entered the Code § 170 controversy in 1986
with its decision in United States v. American Bar Endowment.255 American Bar Endowment (hereinafter "the ABE") was a tax-exempt organization that, to help finance its charitable activities, raised money by
providing group insurance, through regular insurance companies, to
its members.2 5 6 The ABE collected the premiums from the participants and remitted them to the insurers. 257 The ABE group plan had
2 58
two advantages over purchases of individual insurance policies.
First, the size of the group provided bargaining power unavailable to
individuals, and so the ABE could negotiate a lower premium. 259 Second, rather than basing the cost of the insurance exclusively on general actuarial tables, the cost of the insurance was based on the actual
claims that the members made, and the group of the ABE members
had favorable mortality and morbidity rates.2 60 The actual premium
that an insured was charged did not reflect the favorable experience
250

Id.

251

Id.

252

Id. at 424.

253

Id.

254

477 U.S. 105 (1986).

255

Id.

256 All members of the American Bar Association are automatically members of
the American Bar Endowment. Id. at 107. The case involved two separate issues, but
the charitable deduction issue is the one discussed herein. The other issue that the
Court decided was that the income that the American Bar Endowment earned
through the insurance offering program was "unrelated business income." Id. at
109-16.
257 Id. at 107.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
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of the group, but the insurer would refund the excess premium when
experience showed the amount of overpayment. 26 1 The refund was
labeled a "dividend."262 When enrolling in the insurance program,
the participants were required to waive any right to their portion of
the dividend, and so the entire refund was returned to the ABE, which
used the funds to finance its charitable operations. 263 Even though
the individual insured members had no rights to their portion of the
dividend, the ABE advised them that each individual's share of the

264
returned overpayment constituted a tax-deductible gift to the ABE.

The taxpayers in the charitable deduction portion of the case
were four unrelated members of the ABE who had purchased insurance. 265 The Service denied a charitable contribution deduction to

those individuals for the amount of their share of the dividend re266
ceived by the ABE.

The Supreme Court began by noting that "[a] payment of money
generally cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the contributor expects a substantial benefit in return." 267 The Court implied that
the receipt of only nominal benefits would not preclude a deduction. 268 Even when a taxpayer anticipates and receives a substantial
benefit, the Court stated that the taxpayer can qualify for a deduction
if the market value of the benefit received is outweighed by the value
of the charitable gift. The Court referred to this type of gift as a "dual
character" or "dual payment,"269 that is, the gift has both a purchase

element and a contribution element. The reader will recognize that
the dual payment transaction is a version of the part-gift, part-sale
270
transaction discussed earlier in this Article.
The Supreme Court held that the proper test for determining
whether a dual payment may qualify as a charitable gift was promul261 Id. at 108.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 If the insured members had been given a realistic option either to receive their
portion of the dividend or to have it paid to a charity, those members who voluntarily
elected to have their portion of the dividend paid to a charity would have qualified for
a deduction. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-28-001 (Apr. 10, 2002). If that had been the case,
those who elected to have the dividend paid to a charity would have donated property
that they had an unrestricted right to receive. But that was not the situation that the
Supreme Court faced in the American Bar Endowment case.
265 Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S..at 108-09.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 116.
268 Id. at 117.
269 Id.
270 See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
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gated by the Service in Revenue Ruling 67-246.271 In that ruling, the
Service established a two-pronged test for determining whether a dual
payment is deductible. First, a contribution will be deductible only to
the extent that it exceeds the market value of the benefits received in
return. Second, the excess amount of contribution must have been
made with the intention of making a gift-i.e., the taxpayer must have
intended to contribute more than the benefit received. 27 2
The Court noted that three of the four taxpayers in American Bar
Endowment could not demonstrate that they could have purchased
similar policies for a lower cost than the premiums paid and so the
Court said that it must therefore assume that the value of the insurance purchased from ABE at least equaled the premiums paid by
those three taxpayers. 273 The fourth taxpayer was able to show that he
could have purchased the insurance for a smaller amount from a different group for which he was eligible, but because the taxpayer could
not prove that he knew that to be true at the time that he purchased
the insurance, the Court held that the fourth taxpayer did not have
the requisite intention of making a gift-i.e., he could not show that
he had deliberately overpaid for his insurance coverage. 2 74
Thus, the Court adopted a two-prong test for determining
whether a payment qualifies as a charitable gift. First, a taxpayer must
transfer more to the charity then the taxpayer received. 275 This requirement says no more than that there must be a net contribution
from the taxpayer or that no gift was made-an obvious point. Secondly, even if the taxpayer does give more than was received, the taxpayer must have done so knowingly; that is, the taxpayer must have
had an intent to pass net value to the charitable organization. 276
While the first prong of this test is mechanical, and thus appears
easy to apply, the value of the benefit received will not always be measurable. In American Bar Endowment, the Court had to determine the
value of an insurance policy; 27 7 that type of property, however, does

not pose any difficulty of valuation. Insurance is a commercial service
271 1967-2 C.B. 104.
272 Id. The Supreme Court noted that the Tax Court had adopted the two-pronged test, but the First Circuit had rejected the second prong of the test on account
of the subjective nature of that prong. See Oppewal v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 1000, 1002

(1st Cir. 1972) (adopting an objective test of value received).
273 Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118. As discussed below, it appears that the
Court may have applied a subjective value test rather than using a market value. See
infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
274 Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118.
275 Id. at 117.

276
277

Id.
Id. at 118.
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for which an ample number of comparables are available on the market; thus, a strike price value can be determined. Even so, the Court
appeared to apply a subjective approach. The Court stated,
Three of the four individual respondents failed to demonstrate that
they could have purchased similar policies for a lower cost, and we
must therefore assume that the value of ABE's insurance to those
taxpayers at least equals their premium payments. Had respondent
Sherwood [the only taxpayer in the case that could show that he
could have purchased insurance for less] known that he could
purchase comparable insurance for less money, ABE's insurance
would necessarily have declined in value to him. Because Sherwood
did not have that knowledge, however, we again must assume that
he valued ABE's insurance equivalently to those competing policies
of which he was aware. Because those policies cost as much as or
more than ABE's, Sherwood has failed to demonstrate that he in278
tentionally gave away more than he received.
There is some question as to the precise basis on which the Court
made its decision. The emphasized portion of the quote suggests that
the Court treated the subjective value that an insurance policy had to
each taxpayer as representing the value of the benefit received by that
taxpayer. While stating that each taxpayer needs the requisite subjective intention to make a charitable gift, the Court appears to have denied the deduction for three of the taxpayers because they did not
pass any value, using a subjective test to determine value, as a dona-

tion to the ABE. It is possible, however, that the Court's decision concerning the first three taxpayers rests on a determination that,
because they did not value the policies at a lesser amount than the
premiums paid, they failed the second prong of the test in that they
did not intentionally pass a net value to the ABE. Alternatively, despite the Court's reference in its opinion to "those taxpayers," 279 the
decision denying a deduction to the three taxpayers may have rested
on the ground that they had the burden to show that the value of the
insurance they received was less than the premiums they paid, and
they were not able to satisfy that burden. Even though the opinion is

worded subjectively, the Court could have meant nothing more than
that the three taxpayers failed to meet their burden of proof to show
that a net value passed to the ABE. However, the fourth taxpayer did
show that he could have purchased insurance at a lower cost, and the

Court appears to have treated that as a showing that the value of the°

28
insurance he received was less than the amount he paid to the ABE. 1

278

Id. (emphasis added).

279
280

Id.
Id. at 117-18.
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Consequently, in order to deny the deduction, the Court needed to
find that the fourth taxpayer failed to satisfy the second prong, and
the Court did so. The Court's acceptance of a subjective valuation for
the insurance policy that the fourth taxpayer acquired, as contrasted
to a market valuation, suggests that the Court also used a subjective
test to value the insurance policies acquired by the first three
taxpayers.
If the Court truly meant to apply a subjective valuation approach
to the first prong of the test, however, serious administrative problems
arise. For example, a taxpayer makes a charitable gift and in return
receives two tickets to a show. Should the amount of the charitable
deduction depend on the subjective value that the taxpayer places on
the right to attend that show? It is virtually impossible to administer a
test based on the subjective value of the benefit to the taxpayer. 281 In
this regard, it is noteworthy that the regulations to Code § 170 utilize
an objective approach when valuing property in kind that a taxpayer
contributes to a charitable organization.2 8 2 Indeed, an objective approach to valuation is used throughout the tax law-for example, in
calculating an estate or gift tax.2

3

A subjective inquiry should apply

only to the second prong of the test: did the taxpayer have the subjective intent to make a charitable gift? As the Supreme Court subsequently made explicit, the subjective inquiry for the second prong
should focus exclusively on identifiable external facts. 28 4 However, as

we shall discuss later, the objective valuation approach is not free from
problems; valuation becomes highly speculative, at best, when dealing
2 85
with goods or benefits that are not sold on a commercial market.

281 For example, if a taxpayer who received theater tickets from a charitable donee
has no interest in the show and discards the tickets, will his charitable deduction still
be reduced by the market value of the tickets despite the taxpayer's having no use for
them? The Service said yes. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 106 ("[T]he mere
fact that tickets or other privileges are not utilized does not entitle the patron to any
greater charitable contribution deduction than would otherwise be allowable.").
282 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-1 (c) (1), (2) (as amended in 1996) (stating that the
value of the property contributed shall be the "fair market value," which is deter-

mined as the price "at which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts").
283 See id. § 25.2512-1 (as amended in 1992); id. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in
1965).
284 Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 691 (1989).
285 See infra Part ME.
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286
E. Hernandez v. Commissioner

Only two years after deciding American Bar Endowment, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of charitable deductions in a

case involving charitable contribution payments made to the Church
of Scientology. 28 7 The Church of Scientology provided "auditing" and

"training" sessions for church members. 288 These sessions were meant
to increase the spiritual awareness of its members. 289 The Church of
Scientology kept a specific price list for these sessions, and price depended on a session's length and sophistication. 290 Members of the
Church deducted those session payments as a charitable contribution
under Code § 170, and the Service challenged the validity of the
29 1
deductions.
In a five-two decision, the Supreme Court stated,
The legislative history of the "contribution or gift" limitation,
though sparse, reveals that Congress intended to differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients and payments
made to such recipients in return for goods or services. Only the
former were deemed deductible. The House and Senate Reports
on the 1954 tax bill, for example, both define "gifts" as payments
"made with no expectation of a financial return commensurate with
the amount of the gift." S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 196
(1954); H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A44 (1954). Using payments to hospitals as an example, both Reports state that the
gift characterization should not apply to "a payment by an individual to a hospital in consideration of a binding obligation to provide
medical treatment for the individual's employees. It would apply
286 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
287 Id. at 683-84. For a detailed discussion of the background and lower court
rulings involving Hernandez, see Jacob L. Todres, Internal Revenue Code Section 170:
Does the Receipt by a Donor of an IntangibleReligious Benefit Reduce the Amount of the Charitable ContributionDeduction? Only the Lord Knows for Sure, 64 TENN. L. REV. 91, 127-43
(1996).
288 As the Court described them, "audits" are one-on-one encounters between a
participant and a church official (an "auditor") where the participant attempts to
become aware of their own immortal spiritual being. Training sessions are courses
where participants study the tenets of Scientology and seek to learn the knowledge
necessary to become a church auditor. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 684-85.
289 Id. at 685.
290 Id.
291 This rejection of the deduction should not have come as a surprise because the
Service had made its position clear in Revenue Ruling 78-189, in which the Service
explicitly prohibited a charitable contribution deduction for the costs of such Church
of Scientology sessions. See Rev. Rul. 78-189, 1978-1 C.B. 68.
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only if there were no expectation of any quid pro quo from the
2 92
hospital."
The Supreme Court noted that the Service, when determining
whether there is any expectation of a quid pro quo, normally looks to
the "external features" of a transaction. 293 The Court approved that
approach because it "obviat[es] the need for the IRS to conduct imprecise inquiries into the motivations of individual taxpayers." 294 The
Court stated that it had focused on external features in its recent decision in American Bar Endowment.2 95 The Court disallowed the deduction because it held that the payments were given specifically in
exchange for the audit and training sessions received by the members
of the Church, i.e., it was a quid pro quo exchange. 29 1 The taxpayers,
however, made no contention that their payment was a dual payment,
part of which is deductible, and so the Court did not pass upon that
issue.
The Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that a § 170 deduction should be allowed for a charitable gift if the only benefit that the
taxpayer receives is a "religious" benefit. 297 The Court rejected that
argument on the grounds that it had no support in the language of
Code § 170, it might expand the realm of the charitable deduction
beyond what Congress intended, and finally, that it would force the
298
Service to differentiate religious and secular benefits.
The dissent of Justice O'Connor makes some powerful arguments. One of her principal points was that it appears that the Service
treated the Church of Scientology differently from any other religious
organization where a payment was made for some religious benefit
(such as pew rental or attendance at a synagogue on Jewish High Holy
days). 299 Justice O'Connor noted that the Service denied a deduction
in this case because it believed that the exchange was more of a consumption than a contribution. Justice O'Connor stated,
It becomes impossible, however, to compute the "contribution" portion of a payment to a charity where what is received in return is not
292

Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 690.

293

Id.

294
295

Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 691.

296 Id.
297 Id. at 693.
298 Id. at 692-93.
299 Id. at 707-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 C.B. 49
(declaring pew rents and periodic dues to be deductible charitable contributions).
This 1970 Ruling, however, was merely a restatement of the position the Service had
taken since 1919. See A.R.M. 2, 1 C.B. 150 (1919).
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merely intangible, but an intangible (or, for that matter a tangible)
that is not bought and sold except in donative contexts so that the
only "market" price against which it can be evaluated is a market
price that always includes donations ....
Confronted with this difficulty, and with the constitutional necessity of not making irrational
distinctions among taxpayers, and with the even higher standard of
equality of treatment among religions that the First Amendment imposes, the Government has only two practicable options with regard
to distinctively religious quid pro quo: to disregard them all, or to tax
300
them all. Over the years it has chosen the former course.
The dissent makes several valid points. When only a religious
benefit is received, there is no commercial market for comparison to
determine the dollar value of the benefit in order to compute the
amount of overage that made up the contribution part of the dual
payment. The valuation problem, however, may be obviated when the
organization charges a specified price for the benefit. The Service
could take the position that even if a portion of the payment is donative, the taxpayer has the burden of showing the amount of that portion; because the taxpayer cannot meet that burden, the Service could
properly deny any deduction. Alternatively, the Service could allow
the deduction on the grounds that charitable gifts should be construed liberally to carry out the congressional purpose of encouraging
private funding of charitable activities. What the Service cannot do is
to allow the deduction for some religious groups and deny it for
others. The majority disregarded the inconsistent treatment issue because it was first raised on appeal, and so the majority determined
that the record contained no facts from which the Court could ap31
praise the validity of that contention. "
The majority responded to Justice O'Connor's point concerning
the difficulty of valuing the receipt of benefits which are not traded on
a commercial market by observing that, in such circumstances, as reflected in three courts' of appeals decisions, 30 2 the Service valued the
03
benefits at the cost that the charity incurred in providing them.
The three decisions that the majority cited, however, do not support
that assertion. On the contrary, the three courts' of appeals decisions
that the majority cited dealt with the receipt of secular and religious
education for the taxpayers' children at a school operated by a relig300
301

Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 706-07 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 702.

302 Oppewal v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); Winters v. Comm'r, 468
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Dejong v. Comm'r, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
303 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 697-98.
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The benefit that the taxpayers received (the ed-

ucation of their children) was a service regularly purchased on the
commercial market, and therefore easily valued. The Service and the
courts did value the taxpayers' benefit by looking to the cost incurred
by the schools to educate the children, but neither the Service nor the
courts were constrained to take that approach because of any difficulty in determining the market value of the education.30 5
Hernandez was a clear-cut victory for the Service. However, in
1993, after the denial of a deduction for payments to the Church of
Scientology was challenged in the Eleventh Circuit on the ground of
administrative inconsistency, 31 6 an issue which the Supreme Court
had declined to address in Hernandez, the Service backed away from
the Hernandez victory and, in a nonpublic agreement with the Church
of Scientology, the Service agreed to allow members of the Church to
deduct training and audit contributions.30 7 In that same year, the Service declared obsolete its earlier Revenue Ruling 78-189,308 which had
stated that no charitable contribution would be allowed for payments
to the Church of Scientology for auditing and similar services. 30 9
Thus, current tax law is in the awkward posture of the Service having
effectively repudiated its own victory in obtaining a Supreme Court
ruling and instead allowing deductions for what the Supreme Court
held to be a quid pro quo exchange.
F

Recent Developments

In 1993, Congress stepped into the controversy. In the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress added new Code subsection 170(f)(8), which disallows any deduction for a contribution of
304 See Oppewal, 468 F.2d at 1001; Winters, 468 F.2d at 780; DeJong, 309 F.2d at 374.
305 See Oppewal, 468 F.2d at 1002; Winters, 468 F.2d at 780-81; DeJong, 309 F.2d at
375.
306 Powell v. United States, 945 F.2d 374 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that the claim
of administrative inconsistency made a valid cause of action if factually established
and concluding that the plaintiff had stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted).
307 See Sklar v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 2002).
308 Rev. Rul. 78-189, 1978-1 C.B. 68.
309 Rev. Rul. 93-73, 1993-2 C.B. 75. The Service has explained the meaning of
obsoleting a ruling as follows: "Obsoleted describes a previously published ruling that is
not considered determinative with respect to future transactions. This term is most
commonly used in a ruling that lists previously published rulings that are obsoleted

because of changes in law or regulations." 1997-1 C.B. iv. For a discussion of whether
Revenue Ruling 93-73 is valid, see Alison H. Eaton, Comment, Can the IRS Overrule the
Supreme Court?, 45 EMORY L.J. 987 (1996) (arguing that Revenue Ruling 93-73 exceeded the IRS's authority and is invalid).
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$250 or more "unless the taxpayer substantiates the contribution by a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment of the contribution from
the donee organization.

'3 10

One requirement of the acknowledg-

ment is that the donee organization must state if the organization provided any goods or services in exchange for the property received
from the donor. 3 1 If goods or services were received, then the donee
organization must give a "good faith estimate" of the value of those
goods or services, or state that such goods or services consist solely of
"intangible religious benefits.

'3 12

The Code states that "the term 'in-

tangible religious benefit' means any intangible religious benefit
which is provided by an organization organized exclusively for religious purposes and which generally is not sold in a commercial transacrelated
tion outside the donative context."31 3 This language is closely
31 4
dissent.
Hernandez
her
in
to that used by Justice O'Connor
It does not appear that the 1993 amendment overrules Hernandez. The legislative history to that amendment makes no mention
of the Hernandez decision, and the Code itself addresses only substantiation requirements as contrasted to a substantive provision. Not
only does the legislative history to the 1993 amendment not state that
intangible religious benefits should be ignored,31 5 the draft of the
Senate Finance Committee's discussion of the Act states, "No inference is intended, however, whether or not any payment outside the
scope of the quid pro quo disclosure proposal or substantiation proposal is deductible (in full or in part) under the present-law require' ' 16
ments of section 170. 3

In the most recent case involving Code § 170, the Ninth Circuit,
while not passing on the issue of charitable deductions in its holding,
310
311
312

I.R.C. § 170(f) (8) (2000).
Id. § 170(f)(8) (B).
Id.

313

Id.

314

See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 706 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It

becomes impossible .... to compute the 'contribution' portion of a payment to a
charity where what is received in return is not merely an intangible, but an intangible
...that is not bought and sold except in donative contexts so that the only 'market'
price against which it can be evaluated is a market price that always includes
donations.").
315 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13172(a),
107 Stat. 312, 455.
316

RESEARCH

1993 (S. 1134):

INSTITUTE OF AMERICA,

OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION

ACT

OF

TITLE VIIl-FINANCE COMMITTEE REVENUE PROVISIONS AND EXCERPTS

OF STATUTORY LANGUAGE FROM TITLES Ill AND

VII, at 45 n.14 (1993); see also Todres,

supra note 287, at 152 (asserting the 1993 amendment did not affect the result of
Hernandez).
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indicated its view in dictum that the substantive law of charitable gifts
was not changed by the 1993 amendment, and that the ruling in Hernandez represented the current state of tax law on the subject. 31 7 In
Sklar v. Commissioner,18 the Sklars challenged the disallowance of
their charitable contribution deduction for a portion of the tuition
expense for their children to attend a religious school. 3 19 The Sklars

attempted to deduct 55% of their tuition payment because that represented the proportion of the school day that was devoted to religious
education.3 20 First, the Sklars argued that this amount was deductible
because religious education was an "intangible religious benefit," as
that term was defined in the new Code § 170(f) (8).321 Second, the
Sklars argued that they should receive the deduction because the Service permitted a deduction for similar payments made by persons in
the Church of Scientology who give a donation in return for an audit
322
or training session.
The Ninth Circuit denied the deduction. Citing Hernandez, the
court stated that the Supreme Court specifically rejected the notion
that there is an exception to the quid pro quo rule when a donor
receives only religious benefits. 32 3 In dictum, the court noted that it

seriously doubted that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993 changed the definition of charitable contributions under Code
324
§ 170, or overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez.
The court, applying the principles set out by the Supreme Court
in American Bar Endowment, found that the Sklars failed to show that
the payment to the school was a "dual payment."32 5 The court held

that the Sklars failed the first prong of the American Bar Endowment
test. That is, the taxpayers could not show that the value of the secular education their children received was less than the donation given
to the school.3 26 As often occurs in other areas of the tax law, 32 7 there

was a disagreement as to what type of education should be viewed as
comparable to determine the market value of the secular education
317 Sklar v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2002); see Eric Hildenbrand, "No, You
Still Can't Deduct that Payment to Your Child's Private Religious School": An Analysis of the
Ninth Circuit Decision in Sklar v. Commissioner, 55 TAx LAW. 995 (2002).
318 Sklar, 282 F.3d at 610.

319
320
321
322
323
324

Id. at 612.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 613.
Id.

325
326
327

Id. at 621.
Id.
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 482 (West 2002) (listing cases of disagreement).
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received by the taxpayers' children. The Sklars argued that the comparison should be based on the cost of a public education, and thus
the market value would be zero because public education is free. The
court, however, held that the proper comparison is the tuition cost of
a private school education, which has much higher tuition rates than
the donation made by the Sklars. 28 The court allowed no deduction
because the Sklars could not prove that they passed any net value to
the school. 329 Because the court found that issue to be decisive, the
court expressly refrained from passing on the issue of whether the
1993 procedural amendment to Code § 170 affected the substantive
33°
law on charitable gifts. '
G.

Current Status of Charitable Gifts and Analysis

Despite a number of decisions to the contrary, it appears reasonably certain that the Dubersteinstandard of "detached and disinterested
generosity" does not and should not apply to the determination of
whether a transfer to a charity is a gift. Although the Tax Court has
continued to utilize that standard, 33' and the Ninth Circuit initially
utilized it in the Dejong case,3 3 2 it has been rejected or ignored by the
Supreme Court and by several Circuit Courts of Appeals. The First
Circuit and the Court of Claims both rejected the Duberstein standard
for charitable gifts. 333 In the two cases in which the Supreme Court

passed on the definition of a charitable gift, American Bar Endowment534 and Hernandez,3 3 5 the Court made no mention of the Duber-

stein standard. Instead, the standard that the Court used was whether,
and to what extent, the transferor received a financial benefit in re328
329

Sklar, 282 F.3d at 621.
Id. at 622. Because the court found that the donation was not a "dual pay-

ment," the court also stated that it did not have to rule on the Sklars' argument that
the Service applies Code § 170 more favorably to members of the Church of

Scientology than to members of other religions. Id. at 620. Interestingly, the court
does suggest that if the Service were applying such a rule inconsistently, the court

would find that the inconsistent treatment violates either the Code or the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, but it is unclear what remedy the court would apply.
See id. at 614.
330 Id. at 610.
331 Eg., Sklar v. Comm'r, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA) 2000-118, affd, 282 F.3d 610 (9th
Cir. 2002); Fausner v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 620 (1971).
332 See Dejong v. Comm'r, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
333 See Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Crosby Valve &
Gage Co. v. Comm'r, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967).
334 United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
335 Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
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turn for the "donation. ' ' 33 6 In other words, the Court employed a
quid pro quo standard in which both direct and indirect benefits that
the transferor obtained were taken into account. 3 7 The Ninth Circuit
itself appears to have abandoned the Duberstein standard. First, in a
1968 decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the Duberstein standard does
not apply when the charitable donor is a corporation. 338 Then, in its
recent decision in Sklar, the Ninth Circuit did not mention the Duberstein standard even though the tax court, which the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, had used it in making its decision in that case.3 3 9 It is noteworthy that the cases in which the courts applied the Duberstein standard to deny a charitable deduction all involved circumstances in
which the transferor received a substantial financial benefit or indirectly received one, and so the results in those cases would have been
no different if the courts had applied a quid pro quo standard instead
340
of the Duberstein standard.
The Duberstein standard is inappropriate for charitable gifts, and
the appellate courts' express or implied rejection of that standard was
fully warranted. The exclusion of private gifts from a donee's income
is based on the policy of permitting the donor to enjoy vicariously the
consumption purchased with taxed income. Unless the transferor's
purpose in making a transfer is to permit the transferee to use the
funds, the circumstance for which the exclusion was designed does
not exist, and so the transfer should be taxed. The "detached and
disinterested generosity" standard is a useful test to determine
whether the circumstances exist for which the exclusion was designed.
The situation is quite different in the case of charitable gifts.
The charitable gift does not merely allow the taxpayer to transfer
taxed income to another. The deduction allowed to the donor for
charitable gifts means that the income that is transferred to the charity is not taxed to the donor or to anyone else. The congressional
purpose for allowing the donor a deduction is to encourage the infu336 See supra notes 247-53 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 272-80.
337 Even the second prong of the American BarEndowment test, which seemingly is
a subjective inquiry into the intention of the donor, looks to objective factors to determine whether the donor intentionally passed net value to the charitable organization.
See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117-18.
338 United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1968).
339 See Sklar v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'g 2000 T.C.M. (RIA)
2000-118.
340 See Winters v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Comm'r, 309
F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962); Sklar v. Comm'r, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA) 2000-118 (2000), affd
on a different standard,282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2002); Fausner v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 620
(1971); Wolfe v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1707 (1970).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

78:2

sion of private funds into the public sector. 34 1 The charitable functions that the donee organizations perform serve a governmental
purpose, and many of those functions would have to be undertaken by
the government if charities were not there to perform them.3 42 Even
if the charitable deduction is regarded as a type of government subsidy,3 43 however, it serves to combine private and public funds to carry
out quasi-governmental functions and thereby reduce the government's overall costs. While the private donor is able to channel the
direction of the governmental funds to the functions that the charitable donee performs, that can be seen as beneficial in that it decentralizes the decisions as to some of the types of functions that are
supported by tax revenues.
In any event, Congress has chosen to encourage charitable giving
through the allowance of a tax deduction. Uncharitable motives for a
donor's donation to a charity are irrelevant to the congressional purpose for granting the deduction; whereas, a selfish motive for a donor's transfer to a private party obviates the condition for which a gift
exclusion is granted. For example, the fact that a donor's primary
motive for making a charitable donation is to gain status in the eyes of
the community would not affect the qualification of the transfer as a
gift for which a deduction is allowable. The purpose for which Congress allows the deduction, i.e., to encourage the infusion of private
funds into charitable operations, is not impaired by selfish motives of
the donor in making the gift. Regardless of the donor's motivation,
the charity obtains an increase in its net worth through the acquiring
of the donation, and the donor receives no societal goods or services
in exchange (or in the case of a dual payment, receives a lesser
amount than was donated).
Further support for rejecting the Duberstein standard appears
when the case of a corporate donor is considered. Corporations are
341 The allowance of a charitable deduction can be justified for tax policy purposes on the ground that the donor will never consume the donated property, and so
the income tax previously incurred for the acquisition of that property should be
offset by allowing a deduction for the gift. See Kahn, supra note 3, at 15-16, 41-43.
While that may be a valid policy justification, at least for many charitable gifts, the
reason that Congress allows a charitable deduction is to encourage the dedication of
private funds to public uses. This is reflected, for example, in the allowance of a
deduction for the appreciated portion of donated capital gain property. See I.R.C.
§ 170(b) (1)(D) (ii) (2000).
342 While some charities perform functions that the government would not under-

take, the deduction allowed for gifts to those charities is a cost or benefit (depending
upon one's view of the function) of providing a decentralized system for deciding the
types of functions that receive support.
343

See Kahn, supra note 3, at 41.
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business organizations, and they operate for the purpose of producing
income. Although some contend otherwise, it is unlikely that a corporation spends any of its funds out of "detached and disinterested generosity." There likely are some business purposes to the expenditure.
Yet, Congress clearly intended corporations to qualify for a charitable
deduction for making a donation to a charity. Code § 170(a) (2) permits a corporation to accrue a charitable deduction in certain circumstances, and Code § 170(b) (2) sets the limitations on the amount of a
corporation's charitable gifts that can be deducted in a taxable year.
Rather than permitting a corporation a business expense deduction,
which is unrestricted as to amount, Congress chose to treat a corporation's donation as a charitable gift, which is subject to a dollar limitation. 344 The Ninth Circuit correctly refused to apply the Duberstein
standard to a corporate donor..3 45 The conclusion that Duberstein is
not a correct standard for a corporate donor suggests that there
should be another standard available that can apply equally well to
corporate and individual donors, and that other standard should be
employed instead of Duberstein. In other words, if Congress did not
deem "detached and disinterested generosity" a requisite for corporate donors, it likely also did not deem that test to be a standard for
noncorporate donors.
What, then, is the standard for determining whether a transfer to
a charity is a gift? The standard rests on whether the transferor received a substantial benefit in return for, or as a consequence of, making the transfer. A benefit that accrues to the general public is not
"substantial" for this purpose. 34 6 A substantial benefit will not deny
the transferor a deduction to the extent that the amount transferred
to the charity exceeds the value of the benefit obtained, provided that
the donation of the excess value was intentional (i.e., a dual payment) -- 47 We will discuss dual payments later. First, let us focus on
the types of benefits that can prevent charitable gift characterization.
Only benefits that have a financial dimension will be taken into
account. The pleasure that a gift provides a donor, the spiritual experience that a donor may enjoy, and the enhanced personal status that
a donor achieves in the community (although that could translate
into an economic benefit) are not taken into account. Similarly, the
benefits that the gift provides to a sizeable community, of which the
344 See I.R.C. § 162(b).
345 United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1968).
346 See Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 423 (Ct. CI. 1971).
347 See United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986).
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donor is a member, are merely incidental to the donor and do not
detract from the gift.3 48 So, a gift to a theater company that permits

the company to produce dramas that the donor can enjoy, along with
other members of the public, does not constitute a receipt by the donor of a substantial benefit. Even if the donor obtained status from
the gift that enabled the donor to serve on the theater's Board of
Directors and participate in the selection of plays to be produced, that
intangible benefit, whose financial value is difficult to measure, is not
"substantial" within the meaning of the Code § 170 standard. If such
benefits were required to be valued and reduce the amount of a charitable gift, the uncertainty as to the amount of allowable deduction
that the valuation issue would engender, and the prospect of facing
litigation over that issue, would chill a potential donor's enthusiasm
for making a charitable contribution when such benefits might be present. If Congress wished to reduce a charitable gift for the receipt of
benefits of that nature, as it did in the case of a contribution to a
university for which the donor receives a right to purchase tickets to
an athletic event, 349 Congress can establish an arbitrary figure or per-

centage of the donation to be disallowed. A statutory provision for a
reduction of a specified amount or percentage eliminates uncertainty
and is easy to administer. Congress chose that route in adopting Code
§ 170(1), and it can do so in other areas if it decides that a reduction is
appropriate.
Several courts have stated that the benefit must be financial to be
taken into account. The Supreme Court stated in Hernandez that gifts
are "payments made with no expectation of a financial return commensurate with the amount of the gift."1350 The Court took that lan-

guage from the Committee Reports to the 1954 Code. 35 1 But,
Hernandez held that there is no exception to the quid pro quo rule for
the receipt of a religious benefit, and the Court denied a deduction
for a payment for spiritual instruction. The spiritual instruction that
the taxpayers obtained in Hernandez might not seem to have been a

348 See Singer, 449 F.2d at 422-23. Of course, it seems obvious that if the community were limited to members of the donor's family, that would not deprive the benefit of substantiality.
349 See I.R.C. § 170(1).
350 See supra text accompanying note 292; see also supra text accompanying notes
242-47.
351 See supra text accompanying note 292; see also supra text accompanying notes
242-47.
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financial benefit,35 2 but the Court, nevertheless, had no difficulty concluding that substantial benefits existed that precluded gift treatment.
There were financial benefits, however, in that the taxpayers obtained
services that therefore were not available to others. In other words,
the purchase of services by the taxpayers was a consumption by them
of those services. The benefits were no less financial than is the
purchase of personal services in the commercial market.
There is little reason to doubt that there is no per se exception
for a religious benefit insofar as the courts are concerned. The Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez makes that clear. In administering Code § 170, however, the Service has treated many religious
benefits as lacking substantiality. The private settlement that the Service executed with the Church of Scientology in 1993 is sui generis
and should not be taken into account in determining the current state
of the law. As the Ninth Circuit observed in Sklar, before the settlement, the Service had been "embroiled in an endless stream of litigation" with the Church of Scientology, and the Closing Agreement that
the Service executed with the Church in 1993 was a kind of truce to
stem the tide of that litigation.35 3 Whatever constitutional issues that
settlement might raise, it should not be determinative of the tax law's
treatment of other benefits. However, apart from that settlement, the
Service had ruled that pew rents were deductible 354 and has allowed
deductions for payments for tickets to attend religious observances. 355
The fact that there is not a per se exception for religious benefits
does not mean that all religious benefits are substantial. It would be a
mistake to lump all religious benefits into one category of being either
"substantial" or "not." Each religious benefit, like any other benefit,
should be examined individually to determine its substantiality.
Let us now consider what constitutes substantiality for this purpose. Unless de minimis, the acquisition of any property or services
should be considered to be substantial. The transferor obtains the
exclusive use of such property or services, and so the acquisition is
either a consumption by the transferor or represents a future con-

sumption. In Hernandez, the Court stated that Congress intended in
Code § 170 "to differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients and payments made to such recipients in exchange for
352

If an auditor receives compensation for providing those services (and we do

not know if that is so), the training that taxpayers received to become auditors could
have provided financial benefits.
353 Sklar v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 610, 619 n.14 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Eaton, supra
note 309, at 987-89).

354 Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 C.B. 49.
355

Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490

U.S. 680, 707 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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goods or services"; and only the former are deductible. 35 6 In the absence of a countervailing tax policy, the renting of a pew therefore
should not be deductible since it deprives the rest of society the use of
that seat, and a payment made for the right to attend religious services, such as the service on a Jewish High Holy day, should not be
deductible. However, there are tax policies that provide some justification for allowing a deduction when the benefits received are relatively small. We will discuss later the consequences if the payment
made exceeds the value of the acquired property or service, and how
3 57
such property rights or services are to be valued.
It is not necessarily true that contributions for holy day services or
pew rentals should be nondeductible. Attendance at a religious service is an ordinary occurrence in the affairs of a religious organization. If no price were specified for those services, and instead the
members made voluntary contributions of varying amounts to the organization, the payments would not be treated as purchases of services
other than the incidental benefits that are available to all members of
the community. In Oppewal, Winters, and Dejong the courts of appeals
treated a portion of the voluntary contributions that the taxpayers
made to religious organizations as disguised payments of tuition for
their children's education. 35 8 But, it is feasible to determine the value
of a child's secular education because comparable services are purchased on the commercial market, and so the Service can assign a
portion of the contribution to that cost. It is not feasible to determine
the dollar value of attending a religious service because there is no
commercial market for that service. 35 9 The Service could deny a deduction in that case on the ground that the taxpayer cannot meet the
burden of proving the value of the benefit of obtaining access to what
might be a scarce resource (for example, seats at a Jewish High Holy
day service may be scarce). On the contrary, since Congress intended
to encourage the private support of charitable organizations, the Service properly could decide to ignore the value of the attendance as de
minimis, and allow the full amount of the payment as a deduction.
The Service has chosen the latter course of action. The determination of whether to ignore such benefits or to treat them as substantial
could turn on the relative size of the benefit obtained. Ignoring the
356

Id. at 690.

357

See infra text accompanying notes 361-64.

358 Oppewal v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1972); Winters v. Comm'r,
468 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Comm'r, 309 F.2d 373, 379 (9th Cir.
1962).
359

See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 707 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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value of attending a religious service as de minimis does not require
the Service to ignore the value of receiving an education.
The Supreme Court majority suggested in Hernandez that an alternative approach to dealing with the receipt of benefits that are not
commercially marketed is to take as the benefit's value the cost that
the charity incurred to provide that benefit. 360 The circumstances in
which the Court noted that that approach had been taken by the Service all involved the valuation of children's education at a school operated by a religious organization. 361 Apart from the fact that it was not
necessary to resort to a cost valuation in those cases, the cost of providing education can be determined and may bear some relationship to
the value of the services received. But, that is not true for many religious benefits. How would you determine the cost of providing a seat
at a religious ceremony? How would you determine the cost of celebrating a Mass or having a prayer recited for a deceased loved one?
Even if you could determine the cost of providing such benefits, there
is no reason to assume that those costs are commensurate with the
value of the benefit that was conferred (i.e., the amount that a willing
buyer would pay and at which a willing seller would sell). For example, a religious organization has its own doctrinal reasons for wishing
to conduct rituals in a specified manner regardless of whether the cost
of doing so exceeds the value of the services performed. A church
may utilize volunteer teachers to provide Sunday School religious education so that the cost of providing the education may be far less than
the value to the recipients. Cost is not a viable alternative for valuing
the receipt of noncommercial benefits.
What if a religious organization charges a specified fee for a service or property? In that case, if one were to treat the price as having
been set between arm's-length parties, under normal tax rules, the
price itself would be deemed to be the value of the benefit that was
acquired. If so, there would be no deduction for any part of the payment. The difficulty with that analysis is that the parties are not at
arm's-length. The charitable organization presumably is an object of
the purchaser's bounty, and so the purchaser may be willing to pay
more for the benefit than its actual worth in order to contribute to the
charity's operations. The difficulty of ascertaining the value of the
benefit in such cases often will be insurmountable; in order to avoid
that administrative burden, it is reasonable to treat the value of the
benefit as being equal to the price that the charity charged for it.
While that position has a small element of arbitrariness about it; it is a
360
361

See id. at 697-98.
See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
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practical solution, and if it were adopted, organizations likely would
structure their fee schedules accordingly. Moreover, that solution is
supported by the principle that the taxpayer has the burden of establishing the value of the benefits received, which, in such cases, the
taxpayer is unable to do or to prove that the price paid is excessive.
For example, if a religious organization has a Sunday School for
children of its members, and if the organization charges a specified
fee for the religious education obtained at the Sunday School, none
of that payment should be deductible. Perhaps, the congressional
purpose for allowing a deduction might justify a construction under
which the designation of a specified fee would be ignored, but that
would seem to be an excessively liberal extension of the statutory language. Moreover, there is a problem with treating the child's religious education as something isolated from secular education. The
Sunday School training could include historical material and language training, for example, in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin. There is no
reason to treat a fee paid to a religious organization for such education any differently from a fee paid to a secular organization for such
education. Also, for constitutional reasons, the Service and the courts
would be loathe to embark on an attempt to distinguish the secular
educational elements from the religious ones.
The treatment of the receipt of religious benefits is still unresolved. When they are substantial in value, such as the receipt of
educational benefits, they likely will prevent a deduction, except for
the peculiar circumstance of the Closing Agreement with the Church
of Scientology. If they are small in value, and if no specified price is
set for them, the Service will ignore them as de minimis-i.e., as not
being substantial-and there is a reasonable likelihood that the courts
would sustain the Service if the issue were litigated. Even if a specified
price is set, the Service has allowed a deduction when the benefit is
part of the ordinary functions of the religious organization, such as
attendance at a religious service. This treatment may be justified on
the basis that the price is not set between persons at arm's-length, and
the value of the benefit is relatively small.
If the taxpayer receives a substantial indirect benefit from a payment to a charitable organization, that will be taken into account. 36 2
But the indirect benefit does not reduce the net value that the charitable donee received, so why should that reduce or eliminate the
amount of deduction the donor receives? For example, if X donates
land to an educational organization which builds a school on the
land, and the presence of the school enhances the value of land that
362

See Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. C1. 1971).
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X owns for sale in that area, then X has received an indirect benefit
from making the contribution. 36 3 The Federal Circuit denied X a deduction in that circumstance. 3 64 Because the educational organization got the full value of X's contribution, the question arises as to
why a deduction should be disallowed to X. The answer is that charitable deductions are allowed only to the extent that the donor's
wealth is reduced. The statutory deduction for charitable gifts is for
the purpose of aiding charitable functions, but it also serves to recognize that the dedication of the donor's funds for a charitable purpose
is not a consumption by the donor. Because the donor paid tax on
the donated funds and will not obtain the consumption to which that
tax payment entitles the donor, the deduction effectively retroactively
insulates from tax the income that was the source of the contribution.
But, to the extent that a donor is compensated for a "donation," that
amount is still available for consumption; it would be a windfall to
allow the donor a deduction to that extent.
Dual payments are deductible only to the extent that the amount
contributed exceeds the value of the amount of benefit that the donor
obtained from the contribution, and only if the excess contribution
was intentional. There is no reason to deprive a donor of a deduction
merely because he receives partial consideration. If the benefit received is not one that is purchased on the commercial market, valuation may not be feasible; and the alternative of using the charity's cost
as the value may not be practical or realistic. In such cases, if the
benefit received is relatively small in comparison to the amount contributed, it should not be treated as substantial and should be ignored. If the benefit received is significant in comparison with the
contribution made, it should not be ignored; because the taxpayer has
the burden of proving the amount by which the donation exceeds the
value of the benefit, the taxpayer will not be able to satisfy that burden, and no deduction should be allowed.
Congress may deal with this issue in certain circumstances by
drawing a line and allowing a deduction of a specified amount or percentage of a contribution. A contribution to a university's athletic department may entitle the contributor to purchase tickets to athletic
events at the market price, when tickets otherwise would not be available to the donor. The value of the right to purchase those tickets is
difficult to determine. The tickets may be worth more than the price
at which the university sells them. If tickets are not available, the price
charged by scalpers may be the actual value of the tickets, and so the
363
364

See Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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value of the donor's benefit may be the difference between the face
price of the tickets and the price that the scalpers charge. But scalpers typically sell tickets shortly before the athletic event takes place,
and so the value of tickets at the time that the contribution is made
may be unclear. Valuation may be even more difficult if tickets to the
event are available to the general public, but the contribution entitles
the donor to purchase tickets for especially desirable seats which are
not generally available. Congress addressed this problem by adopting
Code § 170(l). That provision authorizes a donor who makes a contribution to a college or university that entitles the donor to purchase
36 5
tickets for an athletic event to deduct 80% of the contribution.
Congress drew an arbitrary line and disallowed 20% of the contribution as representing the value of the benefit that the donor obtained.
If a benefit for which a valuation is not feasible is purchased from
a charitable organization at a specified price, the price could be
deemed to be the value of the benefit because it was set by the charity
in an arm's-length transaction. As previously noted, the difficulty with
that treatment is that the parties are not really at arm's-length because
the charity is an object of the purchaser's bounty, and so the purchaser may be motivated to pay more than the benefits' value. In the
absence of a congressional resolution, such as the adoption of Code
§ 170(l) to permit a deduction of a percentage of a contribution to a
school's athletic department, it seems reasonable, as a matter of administrative convenience, to treat the specified price as the value of
the property unless the benefit is small and is an element of the
celebratory function of the religion.
Let us return to the question of the proper treatment of a donation to a charitable organization by a parent of a child attending a
private school operated by that organization. For the moment, to remove the religious issues from the question, let us have the school be
one that is operated by an educational organization that is not affiliated with a religion. Let us assume that the organization charges a
tuition for attendance which, while a substantial figure, is insufficient
to pay for the cost of the child's attendance. If the school has an
endowment, some of the shortfall can be made up through income
from the endowment. Let us assume that the school has no endowment, or has one that does not provide sufficient funds to make up
the shortfall. The school discloses this circumstance to the parents of
its students and urges them to consider making a contribution to the
school to meet its shortfall and to provide the means of improving its
offerings. Parents are not required to make a contribution; the
365
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child's right to attend the school will not be affected by a parent's
failure to make a contribution. Some parents contribute enough to
cover the shortfall for their child, some contribute more, some contribute less, and some make no contribution. Contributions are also
made by persons who have no children in attendance and have no
prospects of having a child attend. The circumstance described is one
that exists for many private secondary schools and for many colleges
and universities. The contributors who are not parents can deduct
the entirety of their contributions. The question is whether the contributing parents should be denied a deduction for the shortfall attributable to their child's attendance?
In our view, the answer to that question should be no. The contributing parents are paying the tuition that the school charged and
are not required to pay more. For practical reasons, it is appropriate
to treat the value received by the contributing parent to be equal to
the price charged. It does not appear to be relevant that the price
paid is less than the full cost of providing the services to the child
because the parent is under no obligation, legally or by custom, to pay
a greater amount. It is not unusual for tuition to be less than the cost
of providing the education. It is true for both public and private
schools. If the tuition set is reasonable, as determined by comparison
with the tuition for similar schools, the price set by the parties should
be treated as determinative. We know of no circumstance in which
the Service has challenged a deduction for a parent in such a case,
although that does not mean that they could not do so at a future
date.
If one or more of the circumstances described above are altered,
our view of the proper tax treatment might change. For example, if a
child's right to attend would be affected by a failure to contribute, or
if there is substantial pressure on a parent to contribute at least
enough to pay the shortfall, which pressure could arise from disclosures of contributions that would embarrass the parent in the community if it is customary for parents who can afford it to make such
contributions, that would mean that at least a portion of a parent's
contribution was not entirely voluntary. If the only persons who make
contributions are the parents, and if most of the amounts of the contribution relate to the shortfall, that would strongly suggest that the
"contributions" are actually disguised tuition payments.
What if the school makes no charge at all for tuition and obtains
its needed funds exclusively from contributions, mostly from the parents? That was the situation in Dejong. By not making a stated charge,
the parties forfeited the contention that the price charged for the service and accepted by the parent should be treated as the value of the
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service. In our view, the government then is obliged to value the service received by the contributing parent and treat the transaction as a
dual payment in which the amount contributed is reduced by the
value of the service received. The result should be the same even if
contributions are also made by persons who are not parents. If a small
charge is made for tuition that is not comparable to charges made by
similar educational organizations, the contribution still should be
treated as a dual payment. The tax treatment should not be obviated
by the device of making a token charge for the service. While there is
an element of arbitrariness in distinguishing the cases where no tuition is charged and those where a substantial but insufficient charge is
made, it is an identifiable line to draw and has the doctrinal virtue of
treating the price paid for tuition the same as one made at arm'slength. Concededly, the line is harder to defend if a school were to
charge a reasonable fee for tuition and then provide all or virtually all
of its students with a full tuition scholarship. Unless the plan is a subterfuge, we would allow a deduction for the parents' contributions,
even in that case.
There is no reason that the treatment of contributions by a parent of a student attending a private school operated by a religious
organization should be treated differently from the treatment described above.
CONCLUSION

The principal ground on which the gift exclusion has been disputed is that it does not provide an accurate measure of the donee's
capacity to consume and so under-represents the base figure for determining the donee's proper share of the nation's tax burden. Our response to that argument is that there is a competing tax principle to
permit a taxpayer to choose either to use taxed income for the taxpayer's personal consumption or to enjoy vicariously the use of that
income by another for the other's personal consumption. These two
principles must be weighed against each other because it is not possible to accommodate both of them. On balance, in the typical gift
situation, the principle of allowing the donor to vicariously enjoy the
consumption purchased by another with the income on which the donor had paid income tax is weightier than the income measurement
principle, or at the very least is in equilibrium with that principle, and
so the decision to exclude gifts from income does not constitute a
departure from an ideal tax structure. On the contrary, the congressional decision to exclude gifts is appropriate, and so the administra-
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tive and judicial application of that exclusion should not strive for a
cramped construction of what constitutes a gift.
If the transfer of a gift were itself deemed a consumption by the
donor, the donor would thereby have obtained the consumption to
which the payment of an income tax entitled him. If that were true,
the case for taxing the gift to the donee would be powerful. On the
contrary, we contend that the transfer of the gift is not a consumption
by the donor. No societal resource is captured by making a gift. A gift
merely transfers the power to consume a societal resource from one
person to another. The psychic benefits a donor enjoys from making
the gift not only is not a consumption by the donor; it is the enjoyment of that benefit that is the raison d'etre for excluding gifts from
income-i.e., to permit the donor the vicarious enjoyment of having
his income used by a person of his choice. The policy on which the
gift exclusion is based is that a person who pays income tax thereby
becomes entitled to have that income used to consume a societal resource, and the taxpayer should be given a wide range of choices as to
how and by whom that consumption will be enjoyed.
By bringing to light the foundation of the gift exclusion as a balancing of competing principles, that understanding becomes a lens
through which transactions can be examined to properly classify them
as gifts or not. An illustration of the usefulness of that lens is the
question it raises as to whether, under certain conditions, factors
other than the transferor's intent should be taken into account in
making a gift classification. For example, it can help to determine
whether donations to a professional beggar constitutes a nontaxable
gift. It also helps in determining whether the term "gift" should have
a different meaning in other income tax areas such as the deduction
allowed for charitable contributions.
The Duberstein standard of "detached and disinterested generosity" that is used to determine whether a transfer is a "gift" for purposes
of the gift exclusion provision is not an appropriate standard for determining charitable gifts. While the tax court has continued to apply
the Duberstein standard to charitable gifts, more recent appellate court
decisions, including the Supreme Court, have not used that standard.
Instead, the appellate courts have applied a requirement that, to qualify as a charitable gift, the transferor must not have derived, directly or
indirectly, a substantial benefit as a consequence of making the transfer to the charity. If the transferor did derive a substantial benefit
from making the transfer, a deduction will nevertheless be allowed to
the extent that the transferor intentionally transferred a greater
amount to the charity than the value of the benefit obtained thereby
(a dual transfer).
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It is not entirely settled as to what types of benefits will be treated
as substantial. We contend that only benefits of a financial nature
should be taken into account, and it appears that the courts generally
follow that view. There is an open question as to the treatment to be
accorded to a receipt from a religious organization of a purely religious benefit. The Supreme Court has held that benefits are not to be
excluded merely because of their religious nature. In administering
the provision for a deduction, however, the Service has permitted a
donor to deduct the entire amount of a donation without any reduction for the receipt of a religious benefit that is not of a type that is
traded on a commercial market. It is appropriate to allow that deduction if the charity does not set a fee of a specified amount for the
benefit. The question becomes more difficult, however, if the charity
does establish a specified amount as the fee for the benefit. If the
benefit is a basic element of ordinary religious observance, such as
attendance at a religious service, there is a strong case for allowing the
deduction, and the Service has done so. If the benefit is peripheral to
religious observance, and if the size of the benefit is substantial, the
issue becomes murky. In our view, no deduction should be allowed in
such cases.
The court decisions dealing with a child's education at a school
that provides both religious and secular education have denied any
deduction for amounts of contributions deemed attributable to that
education. If a child were to receive exclusively religious education,
we conclude that a fee for that education ought not to be deductible.
However, the only authority on that question is the Supreme Court's
Hernandezdecision, which denied a deduction for the fees paid for the
religious education of adult members of the Church of Scientology.
While the Service subsequently agreed to permit deductions for such
fee payments by members of the Church of Scientology, notwithstanding the contrary decision of the Supreme Court, that concession was
made to bring to a close a long history of multiple litigation between
the Service and that church, which had culminated in a challenge by
the Church to the denial of the deduction on the ground that the
Service permitted deductions for analogous fees paid by members of
other religious organizations. Rather than continue to litigate those
issues, the Service sought to end the dispute. Regardless of the merits
of that decision, it should not be taken as an indicator as to how the
charitable deduction statute will be construed in other situations.

